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ABSTRACT 
 
The Arab Spring demonstrated that authoritarian regimes in the region are not 
immune to violent breakdown. Oppressed citizens are looking for the establishment 
of democratic political systems to replace authoritarian rule. However, where the 
society is deeply divided along vertical cleavages, majority-based liberal democracy 
may not be a viable option. Instead, liberal consociational institutions that 
accommodate cultural and ethnic diversity are necessary. The establishment of such 
institutions should go hand in hand with mutual recognition of cultural differences 
and the autonomy of the polity to ensure the sustainability of post-authoritarian 
power-sharing political systems. This thesis takes the case of Bahrain, a country with 
a deeply divided society, to demonstrate how the existing authoritarian regime may 
be replaced peacefully by a liberal consociational one. It thus examines the prospects 
of liberal consociationalism in Bahrain by applying to the country the three concepts 
of institutional engineering, mutual recognition, and autonomy.  
 
Keywords: Liberal Consociationalism, Power-Sharing, Institutional Engineering, 
Mutual Recognition, Autonomy, Bahrain, Arab Spring. 
 
 viii 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Chapter                Page 
Chapter One .............................................................................................................. 1 
Introduction ............................................................................................................... 1 
1.1. Introduction .................................................................................................... 1 
1.2. A History of Agitation ................................................................................... 2 
1.3. Disagreement over the Situation in Bahrain .................................................. 4 
1.4. Research Question .......................................................................................... 8 
1.5. Methodology .................................................................................................. 9 
1.6. Map of the Thesis ........................................................................................... 9 
Chapter Two ............................................................................................................ 11 
The Power-Sharing Model ..................................................................................... 11 
2.1. Introduction .................................................................................................. 11 
2.2. Integration or Accommodation? .................................................................. 12 
2.3. Institutional Engineering: The Implementation of Lijphart’s Rules ............ 14 
2.4. The Drawbacks of Consociationalism ......................................................... 16 
2.5. Corporate or Liberal Consociationalism? .................................................... 17 
2.6. The Amendment: Liberal Consociationalism .............................................. 19 
2.7. Limitations of Liberal Consociationalism .................................................... 22 
2.8. Mutual Recognition ...................................................................................... 23 
2.9. Autonomy ..................................................................................................... 26 
2.10. Conclusion ................................................................................................. 27 
Chapter Three ......................................................................................................... 29 
The Institutionalization of Authoritarianism in Bahrain .................................... 29 
3.1. Introduction .................................................................................................. 29 
3.2. History .......................................................................................................... 30 
3.3. The Institutionalization of Authoritarianism ................................................ 32 
3.4. Authoritarian Electoral Laws ....................................................................... 37 
3.5. Military and Judiciary Authoritarian Institutions ......................................... 40 
3.6. Class Structure ............................................................................................. 41 
 ix 
3.7. Lack of Mutual Recognition and the Absence of Autonomy ...................... 42 
3.8. Conclusion ................................................................................................... 45 
Chapter Four ........................................................................................................... 46 
Beyond the Bahraini Uprising ............................................................................... 46 
4.1. Introduction .................................................................................................. 46 
4.2. The 2011 Bahraini Uprising ......................................................................... 47 
4.3. Foreign Suppression of the Revolution ........................................................ 50 
4.4. The Institutionalization of Power-Sharing ................................................... 52 
4.4.1. Legislative Authority ............................................................................ 54 
4.4.2. Executive Authority .............................................................................. 58 
4.4.3. Judicial Body ......................................................................................... 59 
4.4.4. Military Forces ...................................................................................... 60 
4.5. Mutual Recognition ...................................................................................... 61 
4.6. Autonomy ..................................................................................................... 63 
4.7. Conclusion ................................................................................................... 64 
Chapter Five ............................................................................................................ 66 
Conclusion ................................................................................................................ 66 
5.1. General Findings .......................................................................................... 66 
5.2. The Particularity of Bahrain ......................................................................... 71 
5.3. A Look to the Future .................................................................................... 72 
BIBLIOGRAPHY ................................................................................................... 74 
 
 1 
Chapter One 
Introduction 
 
1.1. Introduction 
The Arab uprisings proved that authoritarian regimes, no matter how 
powerful they may seem, are not sustainable in the long run. Citizens rebelled 
against oppression and demanded social justice. They are looking for the 
establishment of new democratic regimes that guard their rights of representation and 
recognition. However, in the countries where the issue of sectarianism is not settled 
yet and where there is a gap between the majority and the minority, authoritarianism 
cannot be simply substituted by a liberal majoritarian democracy that does not 
safeguard minority rights. Therefore, a power-sharing model with institutions that 
accommodate cultural and ethnic diversity are necessary. These institutions should 
be protected and defined in the constitution and must include four essential 
characteristics: “(1) executive power-sharing among representatives of all significant 
groups; (2) considerable internal autonomy for groups that wish it; (3) proportional 
representation and proportional allocation of civil service positions and public funds; 
and (4) the possibility of minority veto on vital questions” (Basedau, 2011, p. 4). 
However, the engineering of new power-sharing institutions may not prove 
successful unless it comes hand in hand with the complementary notions of mutual 
recognition and autonomy. 
The first complementary concept to institutional engineering, mutual 
recognition, was primarily addressed by James Tully. Tully emphasizes the 
importance of realizing that cultural identities require some form of 
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acknowledgement or recognition in the institutions of a society as well as in public 
life in order to secure a sense of belonging. Since demands for cultural recognition 
constitute today’s conflict, a new philosophy based on dialogue and mutual 
recognition, added to institutional engineering – both combined together – have the 
capacity to mediate conflicts and bring about peace. Nonetheless, autonomy is a third 
complementary requirement that should be added to recognition and institutional 
engineering in order to build a successful and long-lasting regime. Hence, these three 
complementary notions – institutional engineering, mutual recognition, and 
autonomy – will be explained and discussed throughout this thesis and applied to a 
country facing a deeply-rooted conflict. 
 
1.2. A History of Agitation 
Bahrain, a country with a deeply divided society, demonstrates the necessity 
of replacing authoritarian regimes by a new power-sharing model. A Sunni royal 
family rules a majority Shia population who complain of discriminatory treatment at 
the hands of the government, in a deeply divided plural society struggling for 
democracy. Many sources indicate that the percentage of Shia in Bahrain revolves 
around 70 percent. The Bahraini government avoids publishing any official 
percentage in order not to highlight this gap. 
The Shia majority did not wait for the Arab Spring to demand its rights, 
however. The latest uprisings in the Arab world, the successful ousting of some 
dictators, and the collapse of many authoritarian regimes triggered the Bahraini 
majority to fight again for its basic democratic rights. The Sunni Al Khalifa family 
has governed Bahrain since 1783 and continued to rule after the country achieved its 
independence from Britain in 1971. Iran always had interests in Bahrain because 
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“Bahrain was a Persian province, ruled by a Persian dynasty since 1603” (Tristam, 
2008). In 1979, the Iranian revolution ousted the Shah and established a theocratic 
regime, and its Shiite leaders demanded that Bahrain, like Iran, be proclaimed an 
Islamic republic. Hence, it encouraged the Shia in Bahrain to protest against their 
monarchy. But Saudi Arabia criticized these protests, and since Bahrain’s oil and 
banking system depend on Saudi support, it had to end this turmoil. Additionally, 
Bahrain demanded the help of the United States, which increased its military 
presence on the island. Nonetheless, this decision did not hinder the maltreated 
Bahraini majority from continuously revolting against oppression and 
marginalization. The Sunni-dominated government proclaimed some reforms to 
accommodate the Shia by establishing a 40-member Council of Representatives. 
However, these reforms were not real because political parties were still banned, and 
the role of the Council of Representatives was nullified by an appointed 40-member 
Shura (or Consultative) Council (Tristam, 2008). 
During the 1990s another set of revolts broke out but were “fundamentally 
different from that which prevailed after the Iranian revolution since the relations 
between Iran and the GCC states – Bahrain included – had improved” (Louer, 2013, 
p. 248). Moreover, in 2009, some protests occurred in Iran after the presidential 
elections against the disputed victory of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. These events, in 
addition to the globalization movement that promoted democracy and social justice 
around the world, made the Shia in Bahrain realize that they do not want to be 
affiliated with Iran nor desire establishing Islamic rule. Hence, their struggle was 
restricted to justice, freedom, and the establishment of a parliamentary system, free 
of sectarian and authoritarian control. These demonstrations happened to be across 
sectarian lines since “protestors came not only from the long suffering Shia majority 
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but also from the stereotypically loyal Sunni minority” (Yom & Gause III, 2012, p. 
81). This obliged King Hamad Bin Issa Al Khalifa to apply more reforms. In 
response, he allowed the “formation of trade unions, political societies (parties), and 
an advisory parliament. But none of these reforms changed the condition of Shias as 
second class citizens” (Elrich, 2013). They were subject to continuous discrimination 
and were never granted any high position, neither in the military nor in the 
government.  
 The Shia had protested against injustice and poor living standards but 
Bahrain had never witnessed any uprising like the one of 2011. Unfortunately, 
however, the non-violent uprising led to a violent response from the Sunni-
dominated government and its Saudi ally. They demonized the protestors as agents 
of the Iranian regime. The revolution was consequently portrayed by the government 
as a pure sectarian fight between the Sunni regime, supported by Saudi Arabia, 
against a Shia rebellion manipulated by Iran. Accordingly, the protestors were 
tortured, arrested, and killed. But effectively, the 2011 uprising was triggered by the 
Arab Spring and was not instigated by Iran. It was the product of previous protests 
against discrimination, oppression, and deteriorating socio-economic conditions 
(Tristam, 2008). 
 
1.3. Disagreement over the Situation in Bahrain 
 Different authors disagree on how they perceive the Bahraini regime. On one 
hand, Glada Lahan (2004), Russell Lucas (2004), Kito Boer and Jaap Kalkman 
(2007), and Steven Wright (2008) argue that Bahrain’s authoritarian regime is 
expected to survive. “Political, social, economic, and institutional factors have aided 
in the survival of the Arab Monarchies” (Lucas, 2004, p. 117). Prospects for reform 
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and liberalization may therefore be better than those for democratization. Hence, due 
to the continuous revolts against poor socio-economic conditions and protests in 
opposition to discrimination against the Shia population, the Bahraini government 
was obliged to implement successful reforms, without changing the regime. 
Lahan (2004) contends that in 2002, Sheikh Hamad Bin Issa Al Khalifa 
executed some changes and reforms because the Shia majority was starting to 
complain of the need to change the regime. Lahan cited and approved the reforms 
that were implemented by Al Khalifa, concluding that Bahrain should be seen as a 
prototype for democratic change. However, Lahan does not mention that these 
reforms were minimal and that they were not implemented. She praises the current 
regime that, in her opinion, should be a model for the other authoritarian states. Her 
argument is justified through its publication by the Gulf Center for Strategic Studies, 
which only publishes the writings that praise the activities of Gulf regimes.  
Wright (2008) claims that Bahrain has entered into a more progressive phase of its 
history under King Hamad Bin Issa Al Khalifa. Various parliamentary and legislative 
reforms, in addition to discernable changes within civil society, have taken place. 
“The reforms were driven by a recognition that far reaching political and economic 
changes were needed in order to combat the risk of a return to the wide spread riots 
that Bahrain was plagued with during the late 1990s” (Wright, 2008).  
Boer and Kalkman (2007) interviewed Crown Prince Salman Bin Hamad Al 
Khalifa who argues that “the age-old power struggle between Persia and the Arab 
World is reaching a frenzy” and is manifested by Iran’s desire to dominate Bahrain 
(p. 82). The government is thus demonizing the Shia and showing that they are 
serving the Iranian Shia Crescent agenda.  
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 On the other hand, some authors demonstrate how reforms in Bahrain have 
not been properly implemented and recommend the establishment of a democratic 
regime. Karen Dabrowska (1997) examines the many demonstrations that the Shia 
have organized to fight for their basic rights and to achieve democracy. She also 
describes how the Bahraini government has reacted by arresting, oppressing, and 
breaking the previously settled promises. Dabrowska identifies the instruments of 
authoritarianism; she focuses on the senior military positions that are granted to 
Sunnis affiliated with the regime, the arrests of students, the harassment of women, 
the unfair trials, the death penalty, and the torture of detainees. Dabrowska 
demonstrates that the minority/majority problem has long existed, and that it rightly 
can be classified as a deeply rooted conflict. She contends that the few reforms were 
undertaken only to distract and accommodate the minority. Moreover, she argues 
that the West is putting profits before rights, and is therefore not facing up the 
authoritarianism in such country and not criticizing human rights violations. The 
situation in Bahrain is hence described as a contest between “two worlds”. The first 
is the home of Western bankers who allow Bahrain to be one of the “biggest banking 
centers in the world” and the perfect location for the “American Fifth Fleet”. The 
other world contains the majority of Bahraini citizens who “live in a parched 
environment of deprivation from the echelons of power, wealth, and influence” 
(Dabrowska, 1997, p. 107). The International Crisis Group also issued a policy report 
in 2005 about “Bahrain’s Sectarian Challenge”. The report highlights how the 
sectarian clashes began in 1994 and how they were brutally repressed. It also brings 
to light how the different Shiite political organizations never stopped fighting for 
their rights. 
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 The Arab Spring that initially started in Tunisia and Egypt proved that the 
aforementioned reforms – even if they were exactly implemented – cannot satisfy the 
desire of most Bahrainis who aim for fundamental changes. Therefore, the only 
existing alternative is democracy. Moreover, not any kind of democracy can be 
implemented in Bahrain. Majoritarian democracy does not protect minority rights 
and will most probably cause additional problems. Therefore, the only viable 
political style for Bahrain is consociational democracy or power sharing. 
The existing literature on Bahrain, including the works of Mostafa Abdulla 
(2011), Yahya Fozi (2012), Kristian Ulrichsen (2013), and Frederic Wehrey (2013), 
regarding the latest revolution, explain how the uprising started acknowledging the 
oppression and admitting that the regime should be changed. They are all descriptive 
articles, however, and do not propose a solution or a model that can solve the 
sectarian problem in this country. Therefore, the specific case of Bahrain remains 
understudied since the prospects of the application of the power-sharing model in 
Bahrain has not yet been discussed. 
Given its perpetual instability, the only solution in Bahrain seems to be a 
power-sharing system that protects the rights of the Sunni minority. The prospective 
government should “include the representatives of all significant groups and must 
revolve around inter-ethnic cooperation and log rolling” (Sisk, 2003). This topic was 
thus chosen to highlight the fact that the authoritarian regime in Bahrain is not a 
sustainable option, nor is majoritarian democracy a viable alternative. Thus, this 
thesis argues that the best model for Bahrain is power sharing based on institutional 
engineering, autonomy, and recognition. Bahrain was chosen as a single case study 
because its sociology and economy differ from other Gulf Cooperation Council 
(GCC) countries. Moreover, it is a perfect case for this kind of exercise, embodying a 
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deeply divided society, for the evaluation of the three principles: institutional 
engineering, mutual recognition, and autonomy.  
 
1.4. Research Question 
This thesis describes how authoritarianism and majoritarian democracy are not 
viable options for Bahrain due to sociological and geopolitical reasons, empirical 
incidents, previous protests, and most importantly the existence of plural identities 
that should be protected. “Consociations may be the most benign political forms 
possible after serious internal identity-based wars and the best formats to prevent 
serious or recurrent wars” (O’Leary, 2005, p. xxxv). This thesis hence evaluates the 
prospects of the power-sharing model – the sole applicable alternative – in Bahrain 
and answers the following question: What would a successful power-sharing model 
for Bahrain look like? 
All the aforementioned authors explain how the “rules affect the behavioral 
patterns of the actors” and argue that “well designing and managing these institutions 
is the only way to avoid conflict” (Basedau, 2011). However, in contrast, 
institutional engineering alone can harden divisions in society. Thus the literature on 
power sharing will be applied but some concepts from other authors will be 
borrowed and added to this theory to propose a viable regime for Bahrain. These are 
autonomy (Waldner, 2009) and mutual recognition (Tully, 1995). The thesis will 
hence assess how these three concepts – institutional engineering, autonomy, and 
mutual recognition – should be combined together to produce a successful power-
sharing model in a deeply divided country like Bahrain. This question should 
therefore be answered to evaluate the type of regime that should replace the current 
authoritarian regime given its unsustainability. 
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1.5. Methodology 
Arab monarchies are still trying to verify the sustainability of their 
authoritarian regimes. According to Yom and Gause (2012), three factors hindered 
their collapse: “cross-cutting coalition, hydro-carbons rent, and the influence of a 
foreign patron”. The presence/absence of these three factors in Bahrain will be 
evaluated to justify the failure of authoritarianism and the uniqueness of Bahrain due 
to its distinctive sociological and geopolitical factors. The history of Bahrain and the 
previous protests will therefore be presented in order to highlight that 
authoritarianism is not an option anymore for this deeply divided country especially 
after the Arab Spring. The only viable alternative is the establishment of a 
democratic system that accommodates all the deep divisions in the country. Since 
majoritarian democracy does not satisfy this requirement, this thesis explains power 
sharing; being the unique viable solution, and provides its characteristics.  
In order to assess the viability of this model, three overlapping concepts – 
institutional engineering, autonomy, and mutual recognition – will be explained and 
applied to Bahrain. Thus, these notions will be employed to explore how 
consociational Bahrain would look like. Additionally, a comparative example of 
similar deeply divided countries like Iraq will be explained to evaluate the viability 
of such power-sharing regime. This thesis is thus based on a single case study, and 
the research will be mostly built on secondary sources.  
 
1.6. Map of the Thesis 
The second chapter explains how institutions should be engineered in order to 
establish a successful power-sharing model, and concludes that a new amended form 
of consociationalism, “liberal consociationalism”, is the best viable solution for any 
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deeply divided country. Also, it describes how autonomy and recognition are 
indispensable to hinder the collapse of these institutions. The third chapter examines 
the institutionalization of authoritarianism in Bahrain. It unpacks the unjust laws and 
policies that institutionalized an authoritarian regime and culture in the kingdom. It 
also describes the several demonstrations conducted by the discriminated-against 
majority claiming their rights. The fourth chapter explains the evolution of the 
Bahraini Spring in addition to the governmental, regional, and international 
responses. It also describes the move away from authoritarianism by presenting the 
best viable regime for the Bahraini deeply divided society, including the three 
complementary concepts – institutional engineering, mutual recognition, and 
autonomy. The final chapter summarizes the main findings, describes the current 
situation in Bahrain, and spells out the practical and theoretical lessons of the thesis 
to other deeply divided societies.   
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Chapter Two 
The Power-Sharing Model 
 
2.1. Introduction 
People across the world are currently revolting against oppressive regimes. 
The struggle is not concentrated anymore between countries in the international 
system; it has been shifted to domestic arena. A study published by the International 
Crisis Group in 2012 shows that the majority of the conflicts are classified under the 
internal tension/war category (for example: Sudan, Turkey, Afghanistan, Mali, 
Lebanon, Iraq, and the Arab Spring countries). These internal wars are characterized 
as “domestic” due to the emergence of conflict between plural identities in the same 
country. Nowadays, culture is embedded in every conflict because religion and 
ethnicity, and not nationality, form the citizen’s identity and belonging. In fact, 
further attachment to identity and culture is the product of globalization. People 
became aware of their differences and were afraid of losing their identity in a 
Westernized world, which increased the attachment and identification to their own 
race, ethnicity, or religion. “Globalization actually generates identity – and, indeed, 
the danger that, in some circumstances, it produces too much identity” (Tomlinson, 
2003, p. 272). People are hence focusing on their culture and refusing any kind of 
repression and discrimination against their race or sect. Therefore, in a country with 
plural identities, the minorities and the discriminated groups are currently revolting 
against autocratic and majoritarian rules, and they are constantly seeking social 
justice and looking for equality. These groups will eventually succeed and the 
repressing authoritarian rule will be ousted and replaced by a democratic regime.  
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But how should democracy and social justice be established in plural deeply 
divided societies? A simple majoritarian democracy cannot be applied in deeply 
divided societies and is rarely found in contemporary democracies because it will not 
solve the problem since the minority will still not be represented. Effectively, the 
unique viable democratic regime that can be established to resolve these conflicts in 
any heterogeneous society, after the collapse of the authoritarian rule, is the 
establishment of a power-sharing regime. Power sharing is a “system of governance 
in which all major segments of society are provided a permanent share of power” 
(Sisk, 2003, p. 1). Accordingly, it combines democracy and conflict management to 
satisfy the needs of all the classes, religions, or ethnicities in a single diverse country, 
which will preserve the rights of the minority. 
This chapter compares several forms of power-sharing regimes to conclude that a 
new amended form, “liberal consociationalism”, is the best viable solution for any 
deeply divided country. Additionally, it clarifies that the institutional engineering of 
this new liberal consociational democracy cannot solely build a successful regime. 
Hence, the chapter also defines and interprets the two complementary notions that 
come hand in hand with the establishment of well engineered institutions: mutual 
recognition and autonomy.  
 
2.2. Integration or Accommodation? 
In deeply divided heterogeneous countries, two opposed types of non-
majoritarian power-sharing democracies can be applied, either integration or 
accommodation.  
Integrationists promote the establishment of a single common national (civic) 
identity putting aside all the ethnic or religious parties. They believe that the ethnic 
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or religious divisions should remain social and should not be translated into politics. 
Integrationists believe that new coalitions across ethnical and religious groups will 
be made. Hence, they are promoting a unitary centralized state to maintain territorial 
integrity. “Integrationists deny ethnicity as a source of political power and aim to 
remove ethnic identity as a source of political mobilization” (Basedau, 2011, p. 8). 
However, this system increases the likelihood of violence because identities will 
remain repressed.  
On the other hand, accommodationists mobilize citizens according to their 
ethnic or religious identities and advocate equality among all the groups. 
“Accommodationists seek to ensure that each ethnic group has the public space 
necessary to express its identity, to make its own decisions in areas of critical 
importance, and to protect itself against the majority” (McGarry, O’Leary, & 
Simeon, 2008, p. 42). Therefore, they protect minorities by empowering them and 
granting them equal rights. Hence, the accommodationists prefer the formation of a 
decentralized state and the establishment of a consociational model. Accordingly, 
consociationalism ensures the representation of all ethnic groups; it “accepts 
ethnicity as a source of political mobilization” (Basedau, 2011, p. 8) because the 
social aspect cannot be separated from politics. In fact, political life reflects the 
social ties between citizens. Therefore, if the different groups of a certain country are 
in a constant fight, they cannot form a coalition and thrust aside their social 
problems. It is almost impossible to eliminate the differences in politics and to 
suddenly detach the citizens from their ethnic or religious affiliation in a globalized 
world where identities matter more than nationalities. Consequently, this thesis 
advocates the accommodationist or consociational power-sharing model.  
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2.3. Institutional Engineering: The Implementation of Lijphart’s 
Rules 
The consociational model accommodates and satisfies all the groups of a 
deeply divided country and preserves their dominant identity. It is hence the best 
viable democratic power-sharing regime for any plural society in which certain 
groups are seeking justice. For this consociational model to be successful, new well-
engineered institutions should be established.    
Arend Lijphart was a pioneer in discussing “consociationalism”. Lijphart 
(2008) argues that “consociationalism is the only democratic model that appears to 
have much chance of being adopted in divided societies” (p. 77). In order to establish 
this power-sharing regime, new institutions should be put in place. Hence, Lijphart 
gave the four basic characteristics that should be incorporated in newly engineered 
institutions that will permit the survival of democracy in such divided countries: “(1) 
executive power-sharing among representatives of all significant groups; (2) 
considerable internal autonomy for groups that wish it; (3) proportional 
representation and proportional allocation of civil service positions and public funds; 
and (4) the possibility of minority veto on vital questions” (Basedau, 2011).  
First, an executive power-sharing model should be established. Deeply 
divided countries should be ruled by a parliamentary regime instead of a presidential 
one. In fact, “the cabinet in a parliamentary system is a collegial decision-making 
body, as opposed to the presidential one-person executive” (Lijphart, 2004, p. 101). 
A president elected by the citizens as the head of the state will be the only decision 
maker in the presidential system, which implies a zero-sum game tending toward a 
“winner-take-all” situation. However, in a parliamentary system, the citizens will be 
electing a coalition-based list; and all the parties that succeeded in obtaining a 
significant percentage (the quota should be identified in the constitution, for 
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example: 5 percent) will be accorded respectively a certain number of seats in the 
parliament and appropriately will be represented in the cabinet.  
Second, a minority veto should be granted to minorities in order to preserve 
and secure their political and cultural rights. They should be involved in all the 
agreements and should be entitled the veto right on major decisions like amending 
the constitution. The minority can essentially veto a policy change, and their rights 
should be anchored in the constitution. 
The third characteristic of a well-engineered power-sharing institution is 
segmented autonomy. If the country is big enough and can be geographically 
divided, each cultural or ethnic division can form its own federal and decentralized 
entity. Hence, all the groups would enjoy autonomy. However, if the “communal 
groups are not geographically concentrated, autonomy can also be arranged on a 
non-territorial basis” (Lijphart, 2004, p. 105). Hence, for example, the religious 
groups will maintain control over their schools and churches, which avoids the 
marginalization and discrimination of minorities. Therefore, decentralization is a 
major feature characterizing the institutions in a consociational democracy. 
The fourth and most important aspect of well-engineered consociational 
institutions is proportional representation (PR). The electoral system should be 
fair, simple, and easy to understand and operate. Majoritarian elections cannot take 
place since they oppose the power-sharing consensus by excluding minorities that 
would not be represented. “Proportional representation systems assign seats 
according to the relative strength in the vote share” (Basedeau, 2011, p. 12). Hence it 
is more adequate for an ethnically or religiously diverse and divided society since all 
its groups will be represented. Lijphart suggests that a closed list PR would 
encourage the formation of new coalitions that include different parties. Lijphart, but 
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also Bernard Grofman and Robert Stockwell (2001), Marsha Peipstein Posusney 
(2002), Ian O’Flynn (2010), Matthias Basedau (2011), and Allison McCulloch 
(2012) discuss in details “institutional engineering” or “constitutional design” that 
should be applied in order to obtain a successful power-sharing model. They all 
agree that an electoral system with proportional representation is the only law that 
secures the existence of cross-sectarian coalitions. Moreover, they justify the 
necessity of the formation of power-sharing government that operates in a 
decentralized parliamentary system.   
 
2.4. The Drawbacks of Consociationalism 
Nevertheless, one should acknowledge the problems that may be caused by the 
kind of institutional engineering that is supposed to accommodate conflict between 
all the groups in deeply divided society. The newly engineered power sharing system 
“may contain the seeds of its own self-destruction as the search for consensus turns 
into deadlock” (Sisk, 2003, p. 2). It is not easy to reach a consensus given that the 
parties have different interests and agendas. Consociational regimes create a slow 
decision-making process given the divergent interest of different groups and the veto 
right accorded to the minority. Thus, governments usually fail to maintain a healthy 
decision-making process (Papagianni, 2007, p. 29). Consensus works better in theory 
than in practice and Lebanon is a perfect familiar example characterizing this 
drawback of consociationalism. Tammam Salam’s cabinet was formed after nearly 
eleven months of debates and talks across all the coalitions and sects, characterizing 
the divergent views of the Lebanese parties and groups resulting in a slow decision-
making process.  
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Additionally, “consociational democracy may exacerbate, rather than ameliorate, 
inter-communal tensions” (Seaver, 2000, p. 252). Consociational devices increase 
friction in plural societies, because several socio-economic problems are ignored to 
avoid inter-sectarian conflicts. Moreover, and due to the autonomy given for each 
group and the lack of cooperation between citizens, ethnic identities are reinforced, 
which is more likely to deepen the conflict. Parties fail to get a sense of the opposing 
view, which enlarges the gap and deepens the conflict. Hence, the connection 
between consociational democracy and stability has not been sufficiently 
demonstrated. “All one has to do is glance at the list of consociational failures of 
Lebanon, Cyprus, and Nigeria to see that consociational devices cannot always 
prevent inter-communal conflict, especially in the developing world” (Seaver, 2000, 
p. 248). Nonetheless, according to Lijphart, the establishment of an unstable 
democracy is much better than the existence of an authoritarian regime.  
 
2.5. Corporate or Liberal Consociationalism? 
As previously mentioned, consociationalism is the unique viable solution for 
deeply divided countries. However, the literature distinguishes between corporate 
and liberal consociationalism. In fact, “corporate consociationalism accommodates 
groups according to ascriptive criteria, such as ethnicity or religion,” assuming that 
their identities are fixed and internally homogeneous (McCulloh, 2012, p. 2). This 
common type of consociationalism is frequently promoted by Lijphart due to its 
practicality since it lays down a certain quota or ratio accorded to specific ethnicities 
or religions that should always be adopted. One of the familiar examples of 
confessional distribution of seats is Lebanon, where a Maronite is supposed to fill the 
position of the President, a Sunni as the Prime Minister, and a Shia can hold the 
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position of the Speaker of the Parliament. This consensus was made in the 1943 
National Pact and the Taef accord of 1989. However, this “corporate” consociational 
model envisaged in Lebanon proved to be unsuccessful due to the continuous 
difficulties and deadlocks faced in order to reach a consensus between all the sects. It 
exposed the country to perpetual crisis and external intervention.  Therefore, 
corporate consociationalism produces a slow decision-making process. 
On the contrary, “liberal consociationalism rewards whatever salient political 
identities emerge in democratic elections, whether these are based on ethnic or 
religious groups, or on subgroup or trans-group identities” (McCulloh, 2012, p. 2). It 
protects the individuals as well as the groups’ rights and bears supremacy on the 
corporate model of power-sharing. Corporate consociationalism cannot continuously 
adapt to demographic changes in the country. To accommodate these changes, the 
constitution should be amended, which also causes problems and deadlocks. 
“Corporate rules may create institutional obstacles to the dissolution of protected 
identities” (McCulloh, 2012, p. 8). However, liberal consociationalism can easily 
adapt to changes since the quotas are not constitutionally fixed and depend on the 
people’s decision and views, and is self-adjusting. Moreover, corporate 
consociationalism enhances religious identification and deepens the conflict since the 
citizens will only support their own ethnic or religious parties. Lebanon illustrates 
this caveat clearly. All the communal groups are locked and tied to their religious 
and sectarian identities. On the contrary, liberal consociationalism allows the 
creation of new parties with the emergence of new coalitions gathering various 
ethnic and/or religious groups. Finally, corporate rule classifies citizens according to 
their race or religion and views them only as part of these groups. However, “liberal 
rule leaves people free to decide for themselves whether the ethnic or religious group 
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to which they happen to belong is intrinsically valuable” (McCulloh, 2012, p. 9). 
Accordingly, liberal consociationalism is “democracy-enabling”. Therefore, it is a 
choice between “predetermination” in the corporate rule and “self-determination” 
with the liberal rule. The latter is more effective and avoids the problem of 
immobilization, but it is less likely adopted due to its complexity. 
 
2.6. The Amendment: Liberal Consociationalism 
John McGarry and Brendan O’Leary distinguish between the two previously 
mentioned types of consociationalism: liberal and corporate consociationalism. They 
explain and promote liberal consociationalism by discussing the cases of Northern 
Ireland and Iraq. In fact, the development of liberal consociationalism allowed the re-
emergence of consociational theory and showed how this model can freeze all ethnic 
and religious division. McGarry and O’Leary disagree with Lijphart over conceptual 
matters in the explanation and promotion of corporate concociationalism. They argue 
that corporate consociation models “oblige citizens to vote only within their own 
ethnic community and for their own ethnic parties” (McGarry & O’Leary, 2006, p. 
217). They consider themselves as revisionist consociationalists improving this 
theory and presenting a more democratic and less conflict creating alternative in 
which citizens can vote across blocks for any party they prefer. Hence, liberal rule 
will not eliminate differences between ethnicities and religions, but it would 
definitely put away all the major divisions that cause deeply rooted conflicts. 
McGarry and O’Leary explained the liberal consociational system and 
defended the new Iraqi constitution, which was based on this model. They contend 
that the four basic requirements – that grant minority rights – of a concosiational 
model represented by Lijphart should be present but they amended some parts and 
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added further characteristics. Consociational democracy accommodate groups (a) by 
involving all sizable communities in executive institutions; (b) by promoting 
proportionality in the executive body, legislative body, and the public sector; (c) by 
acknowledging the autonomy right for each group; and (d) by granting minority 
vetoes. 
First, liberal rule approves the involvement of all the communities in 
executive institutions, like in corporate consociationalism, however it does not set 
ethnic quotas. Hence, it rejects the predetermination of political divisions along 
ethnic lines and encourages self-determination. Citizens can freely choose their 
representatives and are not restricted to their own ethnic or religious affiliation. 
Hence, liberal consociationalism focuses on parties forming new interethnic 
coalitions and not on ethic and/or religious groups. 
Second, McGarray and O’Leary promote proportional representation, which 
is also a main condition in corporate consociationalism. However, they detect that 
d’Hondt’s proportional model spreads the allocated seats as evenly as possible. This 
system ensures that all significant parties, and not identities, are entitled to seats in 
the parliament and in the cabinet. Therefore, it focuses on interests instead of 
identities. This model was “invented in 1878 by the Belgian mathematician and 
lawyer Victor D’Hondt. The method relies on the highest averages formula for 
allocating seats in party-list proportional representation” (McGarry & O’Leary, 
2007, p. 695). The allocation of votes is represented by the following formula:  

quo t
V
s1
 
where “V” is the number of votes that a certain party received, and “S” is the number 
of seats allocated to this party so far, starting with 0. Hence, seats are allocated 
singularly one after another. The idea is that the party’s total votes is divided by a 
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certain divisor that increases as the party wins more seats which allows parties with 
lower total votes to also win seats
1
.  
D’Hondt’s method, advocated by McGarry and O’Leary supersedes the 
simple proportional representation allocation model. The latter divides each party’s 
vote by the quota, receiving one seat for each quota. For example, “if there are 100 
seats, then parties get a seat for each 1/100 of the total vote” (McGarry & O’Leary, 
2007, p. 691). Hence, Lijphart’s allocation model only favors the representation of 
parties with significant number of votes. On the contrary, D’Hondt’s method allows 
the representation of a greater number of parties since it singularly allocates the 
seats. 
 Third, liberal consociationalism, like in Iraq, allows citizens to vote freely 
and decide how they want to be governed. “Constituencies decide if they want to 
amalgamate into federal regions or not, which seems to be prudent and completely 
democratic” (McGarry & O’Leary, 2007, p. 678). This action will promote stability 
and prosperity. 
 Fourth, McGarry and O’Leary focus on the protection of minority right even 
though these minorities may form a coalition with other groups. Hence, they agree 
with Lijphart on the necessity of the establishment of a “minority veto”. However, 
they think that two independent institutions should be created to ensure the right 
representation of all ethnicities or religions. For example, MacGarry and O’Leary 
                                                 
1
 Example of how d’Hondt method works (McGarry and O’Leary 2007, 271):  
Round P1 P2 P3 P4 P5 Comments 
1 39 16 9 23 17 P1 has the highest total, wins 1
st round, and total (39) will be divided by 2 (1+1) 
2 19.5 16 9 23 17 P4 has the highest total, wins 2
nd round, and total (23) will be divided by 2 (1+1) 
3 19.5 16 9 11.5 17 P1 has the highest total, wins 3
rd round, and total (39) will be divided by 3 (2+1) 
4 13 16 9 11.5 17 P5 has the highest total, wins 4
th round, and total (17) will be divided by 2 (1+1) 
5 13 16 9 11.5 8.5 P2 has the highest total, wins 5
th round, and total (16) will be divided by 2 (1+1) 
6 13 8 9 11.5 8.5 P1 has the highest total, wins 6
th round, and total (39) will be divided by 4 (3+1) 
7 9.75 8 9 11.5 8.5 P4 has the highest total, wins 7
th and final round 
Seats 3 1 0 2 1 TOTAL: 7 seats 
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argue that in Iraq, the Federal Council and the Supreme Court should be created to 
prevent the “dominant community from riding roughshod over the other demoi” 
(McGarry & O’Leary, 2007, p. 695). The Federation Council should be formed by 
the different groups represented in all the federations or constituents. Its role is 
restricted to approving legislative laws and constitutional amendments. And the 
Supreme Court should have three main functions: interpreting the constitution, 
solving the disputes between regional and federal bodies, and deciding if the laws 
ratified by federal and regional legislatures comply with the constitution. 
 These amendments help transform corporate rule into liberal rule, and allow 
the re-emergence and re-consideration of consociationalism as a viable power-
sharing model after it was long considered as an unworkable system. 
 
2.7. Limitations of Liberal Consociationalism 
Yet, even the better version of consociationalism – liberal rule – cannot by 
itself establish security, perfect democracy, cooperation, peace, stable institutions, 
and a conflict-free country. Additionally, since it does not set a certain quota, it 
cannot secure the preservation and representation of all the identities. In fact, “it does 
not provide ethnic groups with the same level of certainty as predetermination” 
(McCulloh, 2012, p. 10). David Waldner (2009) argues that to secure power sharing, 
institutional engineering alone is not enough and cannot solve sectarian or ethnic 
divisions. “On its own, institutional engineering fails to engender interethnic political 
dynamics and alliances, and hence democratic stability” (Salloukh & Clark, 2013, p. 
744). Institutional engineering based on a liberal consociational approach can only 
minimize the divisions and end some short-term conflicts. Therefore, in order to be 
classified as a successful model, it should come hand in hand with other reforms, 
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such as autonomy and mutual recognition. As Waldner suggests, “institutions are not 
direct causes of democratic stability, instead they are only indicators” (Waldner, 
2009, p. 1). They will set the ground for a flourishing establishment of a democratic 
system, but cannot be sustainable without the presence of two essential concepts: 
mutual recognition and autonomy. 
 
2.8. Mutual Recognition 
James Tully (1995) emphasizes the role of modern constitution in 
recognizing and accommodating cultural diversity. All the religious or ethnic groups 
should have their demands and fears be protected by the constitution. However, these 
demands are “limited by the conditions necessary for institution and preservation of 
the social order” (Owen, 2011, p. 142). All the request of these groups cannot hence 
be accommodated in the constitution. Tully replaces the unattainable absolute 
accommodation of cultural diversity by the necessity of building mutual recognition 
among different cultures to enhance the appropriate functioning of the institutions 
and the establishment of intercultural peace (1995, p. 177). Additionally, he praises 
the non-violent nature of the Bahraini and Egyptian revolutions and suggests that the 
type of revolution will shape the future institutions because the means shape the ends 
(Tully, 2012, p. 16).  Theorists tend to prioritize imposing institutions to ensure 
democracy rather than acknowledging and solving the complex plurality of already 
existing relationship problems (Tully, 2012, p. 5). However, people do not only 
interact with others through institutions, but they also engage in various social 
activities. Therefore, conflicts among these citizens should be prioritized and 
resolved in order to avoid the collapse of well-designed institutions. If a respectable 
relation was not established between all the ethnicities, religions, and groups of a 
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single country; all the institutions, no matter how strong they were, cannot function 
appropriately. If discrimination and lack of recognition describe the relation between 
citizens, conflict will arise and democracy would not result. Hence diversity should 
be accommodated in order to avoid the collapse of all the institutions. 
Recognition is achieved through accepting and acknowledging the language, 
religion, history, schools, and institutions of other cultures. “A just form of 
constitution must begin with the full mutual recognition of the different cultures of 
its citizens” (Tully, 1995, p. 8). Cultural recognition is the most dangerous problem 
of this age since all the conflicts are arising from the lack of this condition. And all 
the signs indicate that these problems increased with globalization, which made 
people more aware of their differences and more attached to their race or religion. 
Recognition of the “other” is also achieved through listening to their stories, 
conducting intercultural dialogues, and exchanging experiences and pain caused by 
the other. The aim is not to produce a new uniform culture ignoring or eliminating 
the differences. Instead, all the cultures should be recognized in their language or 
voice without imposing a dominant culture. Hence, differences and cultural plurality 
are preserved instead of imposing uniformity and regularity. Traditions should be 
equally recognized and accepted by assimilating different cultures. The new 
constitution should support the concept of mutual recognition by protecting all the 
cultures, advocating group freedom, and imposing the respect of all individuals, 
without according privileges to a certain group, race, or religion. “A modern 
constitution is based on agreement, while an ancient constitution is based on de facto 
habit or custom” (Tully, 1995, p. 61). Previously, in all authoritarian regimes, the 
dominant culture of the people in power was imposed on all the citizens. In contrast, 
an agreement should be made between all the groups of a single country in order to 
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respect each other’s identity because people should be taken as equal citizens living 
in the same society. 
Recognition and accommodation of cultural diversity can prove successful 
only when all the groups manage to put themselves in the shoes of other groups to 
understand their point of view. “Free and open communication enables different 
groups to discover their own partiality by learning something about others’ 
perspective on their collective problems and on themselves” (Tully, 1995, p. 132). 
This dialogue and story-sharing will raise diversity awareness and will allow groups 
to understand “the other” as well as themselves by seeing their image in the eyes of 
different groups. This interaction will allow the conservation of multiple cultures and 
the recognition of asymmetry. 
Tully argues that federalism is certainly the best way to accommodate 
cultural diversity because it enables all the groups to reach agreement, accept others, 
and govern their own entity. Hence, each group can rule itself, and their autonomy 
should be respected by the central government and by the other constituents and 
groups. Nonetheless, a province has the choice to delegate its power and to be ruled 
by the federal government, if it desires. However, a federal regime cannot prove 
successful without the implementation of the concept of “mutual recognition”. If the 
federations were separated and each group was allowed to govern itself; without 
mutually recognizing the other, problems will arise. Such is illustrated in the current 
situation of Iraq where citizens from different sects and backgrounds are fighting and 
involved in a continuous sectarian war. Hence, federations and autonomy cannot be 
established without the settlement of mutual recognition since repressing identities 
and cultural rights will result into war and extremism. When a certain group feels 
rejected and not recognized, its radical attachment to its identity will be triggered, 
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from which extremism and fundamentalism grow. Therefore, “different peoples, 
religions, and cultures should learn how to respect and honor each other’s 
differences” (Tully, 1995, p. 212) to live in a diversified and peaceful environment 
because the differences should be enriching the country instead of separating it.  
 
2.9. Autonomy 
“The challenge of building democratic regimes in deeply divided societies 
becomes even more complicated in regions where groups with shared identities 
transcend state boundaries” (Seaver, 2000, p. 248). Successful power sharing with 
strongly engineered institutions will collapse if external countries interfere and make 
decisions on behalf of an absent government. These great powers, instead of fighting 
directly on their territory, are implicitly combating on the terrain of a certain geo-
politically strategic country, and the victim state will then suffer the consequences. 
For example, in Lebanon
2
, the decision is never made autonomously by the Lebanese 
parties or groups. The war in Lebanon did not end because the Lebanese parties 
agreed to settle the conflict; but only because the external countries arranged to end 
the deeply rooted conflict. And alas, till now, any decision or any conflict is not 
solved until external countries and great powers settle their problems and provide the 
Lebanese parties the green light. Hence, there is a lack of sovereignty and the people 
do not get the chance to be “democratically governed” and to autonomously make 
their own decisions and get their rights. Therefore, if the external powers get the big 
hand on the country, all the institutions will not properly work and will reach a 
stagnation phase, and later on they might collapse. These institutions will hence 
                                                 
2
 The 15-year (1975 – 1990) Lebanese war ended by signing the “Taef Agreement” in Saudi Arabia 
only after the development of the international agreement over the Lebanese case among the 
following countries: Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Syria, France, the United States of America, and the 
blessing of Iran.   
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provide a cover for external intervention. Only if the country was sovereign and 
autonomous will the newly engineered institutions get the chance to independently, 
democratically, and successfully apply the rules settled for a fair power-sharing 
model. 
Unfortunately, full autonomy does not exist anymore in this era of 
interdependence, with the emergence of multinational organizations, and the 
formation of regional groups (regionalism), in a globalized world. The great powers 
cannot be “great” if they did not influence other less-powerful countries. Moreover, 
any country cannot survive if it disconnects itself from other states. However, the 
less powerful strategic countries are the ones suffering most from the lack of 
autonomy. Hence, “many forces abroad in the world challenge the established 
models and practices of state sovereignty and autonomy” (Baker, 1999). Especially 
in plural societies, external actors profit from the division and take a side with a 
group hindering the autonomy of the state. But, dependency should retain a certain 
degree of autonomy in order to protect decisions and citizen’s will and dignity. In 
fact, people recognize the changes in the world order but insist on shaping their fate 
and enjoying a certain degree of self-governing autonomy (Pauly & Coleman, 2008).  
 
2.10. Conclusion 
This chapter examined three overlapping concepts – institutional engineering, 
mutual recognition, and autonomy – and contended that they should go hand in hand 
in order to have a successful power sharing agreement in a deeply divided society. 
All the scenarios emphasize that the three notions are inseparable. In fact, well-
designed institutions will immediately collapse if people are not willing to abide by 
the rules and recognize the “other” – even if the institutions were perfectly 
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engineered and provided the perfect environment for the establishment of 
democracy. They will not properly function and the war or the deep conflict will 
restart again leading to more complicated conflicts. Additionally, even if the 
institutions were perfectly engineered and all the groups mutually recognized each 
other, the country cannot democratically function if the government was not 
sovereign and enjoying a certain degree of autonomy. Moreover, if a certain country 
enjoys autonomy and citizens “recognize” each other, the country cannot function 
without adequate institutions to organize and settle democracy. Therefore, these three 
concepts, combined together, are crucial for the establishment of a successful 
democratic power-sharing model in any deeply divided society.  
The next chapter examines the institutionalization of authoritarianism in 
Bahrain to understand the deeply rooted conflicts and the sufferance of its repressed 
minority. This helps applying in the following chapters, the three concepts – 
institutional engineering, mutual recognition, and autonomy – necessary to resolve 
Bahrainis political predicament. 
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Chapter Three 
The Institutionalization of Authoritarianism in 
Bahrain 
 
3.1. Introduction 
The Kingdom of Bahrain consists of thirty-three small islands and is located 
in the Persian/Arab Gulf, between Qatar and Saudi Arabia. The economy of Bahrain 
depends on trade more than petrochemical industry due to its poor oil resources in 
comparison with the rest of the Gulf countries. It ameliorated its financial institutions 
and liberalized its market to establish an attractive environment for foreign investors. 
Bahrain became the leader in financial regulations and the center for banking 
services in the Gulf area.  
Bahrain is not a homogeneous Arab state due to its particular ethnic 
composition. Thirty percent of the populaiton follows the Sunni branch of Islam, 
while the majority (70 percent) belongs to the Shia sect. The last official 
demographic statistics were conducted in 1941, however. The Shia population 
constituted then only 53 percent of the entire Bahraini population (Lawson, 1989, p. 
3). Later, in the middle of 1980s, when the percentage of the Shia citizens started to 
rise, the Sunni government stopped issuing official statistics to avoid highlighting the 
sectarian demographic gap. Despite their numerical disadvantage, the Sunnis have 
dominated the country through authoritarian rule that dates to the 17
th
 century. It has 
continuously discriminated against the Shia community, which makes up the 
majority of Bahraini citizens. This has caused constant protests demanding the 
establishment of reforms, social justice, and equality. 
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This chapter examines the institutionalization of authoritarianism in Bahrain. 
It unpacks the unjust laws and policies that institutionalized an authoritarian regime 
and culture in the kingdom. This empirical knowledge is provided to evaluate how 
the ruling family imposed its authoritarian institutions and culture. This is a 
prerequisite to understand the application of a new power-sharing system in the next 
chapter. 
 
3.2. History 
Bahrain is the smallest state in the Gulf Cooperation Council, and its 
population is the most complex among those states. In fact, as previously mentioned, 
the Shia citizens currently constitute 70 percent of the Bahraini population, while the 
Sunni ruling sect forms only 30 percent of the population. This uneven authoritarian 
domination by the Sunni regime, due to historical facts, launched several sectarian 
clashes between the discriminated Shia majority and the Sunni-dominated 
government.  
The islands were ruled by the Persians up to the 4
th
 century, and then were 
conquered by the Arabs, and stayed under Arab rule until 1541. However, Persia 
believed then that Bahrain should be under its own authority. It hence fought and re-
claimed it in 1603, which explains the significant presence of Shia in Bahrain 
(Tristam, 2008). However, Ahmad Ibn Al-Khalifa, backed by Arab Sunni Tribes, 
succeeded in invading the islands of Bahrain through Qatar during the 18
th
 century 
(1783), overthrowing the Persian administration and establishing Al-Khalifa rule 
(International Crisis Group, 2005, p. 4). Henceforth, the ruling family began 
importing and nationalizing Sunni Bedouins from Syria and other Arab Muslim 
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countries to counter-balance the percentage of Shia population (Dabrowska, 1997, p. 
6).  
When Britain decided to secure its road to India, it made Bahrain a British 
protectorate in 1820. These two countries ratified a treaty recognizing Al-Khalifa as 
the ruling family of Bahrain. The Bahraini administration was forbidden from 
signing any agreement with a foreign government without the consent of British 
authorities. In return, Britain secured the Bahraini islands from external aggression, 
“mainly referring to Iran and its continuous desire to annex Bahrain under its 
authority claiming that it originally belongs to the Persian Empire” (Lawson, 1989, 
p. 30). Under the British mandate and due to its strategic location, Bahrain succeeded 
in increasing its commercial activity and the amount of manufactured products 
passing through its territory. “Although oil was discovered in Bahrain during the 
1930s, it was relatively little compared to other Gulf states, and the wells are 
expected to be the first in the region to dry up” (Nakhleh, 1976, p. 4). Sheik Issa Ibn 
Salman Al-Khalifah, who became Emir in 1961, was determined to diversify and 
promote his country's economy. He successfully promoted Bahrain as a major 
regional financial and banking center.  
Bahrain became independent on 14 August 1971, following Great Britain’s 
decision to pull its armed forces out of the Gulf. Its 108-article constitution was 
ratified in June 1973 guaranteeing that all Bahraini citizens are equal before the law 
and granted justice, freedom of speech, freedom of press, and freedom of religious 
beliefs (Dabrowska, 1997, p. 9). Moreover, all the population is entitled to free 
primary education and free medical care. These laws have nonetheless never been 
uniformly applied as the Sunni minority enjoys more privileges and rights than the 
marginalized Shia citizens. Similarly, the articles referring to freedom of speech, 
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freedom of press and equality were never applied at the political, economic, and 
social levels. The authoritarian regime was implied and the citizens were 
continuously supposed to acknowledge that the Al-Khalifa is the single ruling family 
of Bahrain with absolute powers. The formation of political parties was consequently 
banned.  
 
3.3. The Institutionalization of Authoritarianism 
The 1973 constitution states that “the political body of Bahrain is constituted 
of a national Assembly composed of 14 appointed members of the Cabinet and 30 
members elected by popular vote” (Nakhleh, 1976, p. 10). However, the Emir should 
ratify all rules issued by this assembly, and can issue decrees without referring to the 
national assembly. He can also dissolve the assembly and the appointed cabinet at 
any time. This characterizes the type of regime in Bahrain as authoritarian. A law 
was issued by the Emir on the 22
nd
 of October, 1974, and is still being applied today. 
Entitled “Decree Law on State Security Measures”; it “empowers the minister of 
interior to order the detention of any political suspect for three years without charge 
or trial” (Human Rights Watch, 2012, p. 7). The parliament protested against this 
unjust and non-humanitarian rule, but the Emir refused this objection and hence 
suspended the parliament and the constitution in 1975. Instead, he appointed a 
Consultative Council (Majlis Al Shura) justifying its legitimacy as being equally 
divided between Sunnis and Shias, and not including any member from Al-Khalifa 
ruling family. However, this Shura Council can only propose some laws and present 
them to the Emir, but has absolutely no power in legislating new decrees or 
amending existing laws. Moreover, it is always headed by a pro-regime Shia figure 
and its members are handpicked mainly from loyalist families.   
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The first coup against the regime took place in 1981, after the 1979 Iranian 
revolution, and was directly supported by Tehran, aiming at regaining power over 
Bahrain and spreading its Islamic revolution. “The Islamic Front for the Liberation 
of Bahrain party published newsletters and books in which it described its attempts 
to overthrow the Al Khalifa ruling family and install Iranian-style Islamic rule 
instead. These documents provided evidence for the group's involvement with the 
Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps, and of the support the Iranian regime provided 
for their activities against the Bahraini government” (Al-Hasan, 2011, p. 603). But 
the coup failed and 73 protestors from the party were exiled or arrested. After the 
failure of this movement, the Shia population was subjected to additional 
discrimination, which increased their isolation and aggravated their living standards. 
“A prominent Shia cleric lost his citizenship, and a Shia cabinet minister went to jail 
on charges of funneling money to Iran’s Islamic Guard Corps” (Wehrey, 2013, p. 
122). The protests were re-launched in 1992 but this time due mainly to the 
deteriorating socio-economic conditions and the further marginalization and 
discrimination against the Shia population. Three hundred Bahraini intellectuals 
submitted a petition to the Emir requesting the restoration of the parliament and the 
constitution. Moreover, they demanded an end to discriminatory policies that were 
being used against the Shia community. However, the ruling family ignored these 
demands. A bigger movement was organized two years later, in October 1994. The 
same petition was signed by 25,000 citizens from both sects – Sunni and Shia. They 
pointed to Article 65 of the constitution, which states that “if the Assembly was 
dissolved, elections for a new assembly must be held within a period not exceeding 
two months after the date of dissolution. If elections were not held during this period, 
the dissolved assembly would restore its complete constitutional powers, and shall 
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meet immediately as if the dissolution has not taken place and shall continue its 
functions until a new assembly is elected” (Dabrowska, 1997, p. 11-12). The Emir 
categorically refused the petition and believed that this movement crossed the red 
line. He hence ordered the deployment of security forces against the protestors. The 
Sunni government labeled this movement as a Shia-led revolution backed by Iran – 
much like the first failed coup in 1981 – and aimed at overthrowing the Sunni regime 
supported by the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the United States. But, “the 1990s 
uprisings were fundamentally different from that which prevailed during the 1981 
coup attempt. The uprising occurred in a period when the relation between Iran and 
the GCC states had markedly improved” (Louer, 2013, p. 248). Iran did not want to 
intervene anymore in Bahrain and desired instead to maintain good relations with all 
the Gulf states. To prove its good intentions, Iran closed the office of the Bahraini 
opposition party in Tehran (Dabrowska, 1997, p. 52). 
Four parties formed the Bahraini opposition: Popular Front in Bahrain, 
Islamic Front for the Liberation of Bahrain, National Liberation Front, and Bahrain 
Freedom Movement. They issued a joint statement on April 12, 1994 rejecting the 
decree. The government reacted by suspending the National Assembly and the 
constitution. They also called for the suspension of the “State Security Law”, 
demanded the release of all political prisoners, and organized a peaceful 
demonstration to express their demands. Moreover, they insisted on a review of 
discriminatory employment policy since the Bahraini unemployment rate became the 
highest among the Gulf states
3
. However, the security forces responded by arresting 
some Bahraini citizens for taking part of the demonstration (International Crisis 
Group, 2005, p. 8). Additionally, the security forces voided the home and arrested 
                                                 
3
 “It was estimated that up to 30,000 Bahraini nationals were without jobs in 1990, a figure 
representing more than 30 percent of the national work-force” (Dabrowska 1997, 13). 
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the Shia pro-democracy campaigner Sheikh Ali Salman. The ruling family used 
different methods to repress the popular uprising: it blocked roads and sprayed tear 
gas from helicopters. Consequently, hundreds of Bahraini citizens were killed or 
arrested as a result of the cruel aggression of the security forces. For example, “Hani 
Abbas Khamis and Hani Ahmad Al-Wasti were shot dead during the demonstrations, 
Zainab Al-Rashed was hit in the eye by a bullet when she was resisting a policeman 
who arrested her son, and the forces hit Ali Mohammed Ismael and broke three of his 
ribs” (Humans Rights Watch, 2012). The Committee for Human Rights in New York 
estimated that 5,000 Bahraini citizens were detained between December 1994 and 
January 1996. Several international reporters were also deported because they 
described accurately the cruel actions performed by the security forces and did not 
accept the regime’s version of events which demonized the Shia community and 
refused to relate this movement to Iran’s desire of dominating the country. 
Nevertheless, the demonstrations and the democratic demands for justice, 
employment, and the release of detainees never stopped. On the other side, the 
application of violence, torture, death sentences, unfair trials, arrests of students, 
harassment of women, religious discrimination, and forced exile against the 
opposition never stopped also. The regime refused to respond to the demands of 
Amnesty International and human rights organizations. “Meanwhile the Iranian press 
dismissed Arab, Gulf, and Bahraini accusations of involvement in Bahrain unrest” 
(Dabrowska, 1997, p. 34). It aimed at mending its relation with the Gulf states and 
refused all the accusations of backing up the protestors and aiming at annexing 
Bahrain to its territory. 
Recommendations to end the violence were sent to the Bahraini government 
from Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, and the British authorities. This 
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drove the new Emir, Sheikh Hamad Al-Khalifa, in 2001 to announce the 
establishment of some reforms that tried to accommodate the opposition. These 
reforms were divided into two categories: political and economic. On one hand, 
political reforms included the decision to dissolve the State Security Law, giving 
citizens more freedom to express their views, granting voting rights to both genders, 
and creating a new 40-member elected Council of Representatives. The King also 
released 320 political prisoners and pledged that a constitutional commission would 
be formed to propose adequate amendments to the 1973 constitution (Lahan, 2004, p. 
6). “In 2001, the Emir introduced the National Action Charter, which called for the 
creation of a constitutional monarchy, a new legislative structure, an independent 
judiciary, and allowed women’s political participation” (Wehrey, 2013, p. 119). On 
the other hand, the regime continued to liberalize the Bahraini market, which 
improved its significance as an attractive banking center. The Emir also slightly 
reduced rent value and electricity costs, and offered a one-month bonus to 
government workers.         
However, only the aforementioned economic reforms were implemented 
while all the promises of political reforms were ignored. The ruling family persisted 
in discriminating against Shia citizens, ignoring all the political reforms, and 
institutionalizing authoritarian laws. Additionally, the Emir changed the constitution, 
declaring himself a King and issued a new law for the upcoming 2002 elections. This 
decree appointed a superior 40-member Shura Council, which nullified the role of 
the elected Council of Representatives.  
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3.4. Authoritarian Electoral Laws 
The Bahraini legislative authority is comprised of the King and the National 
Assembly. The Assembly is bicameral, formed by the appointed Consultative 
Council and the elected Chamber of Deputies, the first being the superior with law-
making powers. “The Consultative Council has effective veto power over decisions 
made in the Chamber of Deputies, and in the event of a deadlock, the president of the 
Council casts the tie-breaking vote” (Carnegie, 2009, p. 4). Additionally, the elected 
council is only allowed to propose or amend laws, it is forbidden to initiate or draft 
any legislation. Even though the role of the Council of Representatives – Majlis al 
Nuwab – was nullified by the appointment of a superior council, the ruling family 
insisted on holding the first elections in 2002, after the suspension of parliament in 
1975, to show the Shia community and the entire world that the government is 
implementing reforms and conducting a fair democratic activity allowing the 
representation of the opposition. However, to secure majority seats in parliament, the 
government issued an unfair electoral law, which gerrymandered electoral districts to 
favor Sunni candidates and areas. 
The 2002 electoral law set by the government and the King determines the 
four-year term of the lower house and sets the rules of the parliamentary elections. 
All Bahraini citizens above 21 years old (women and men) are allowed to vote. To 
increase the number of Sunni voters, “citizens of GCC countries who are Bahraini 
residents as well as non-residents who own property in Bahrain are also allowed to 
vote, but citizens of non-GCC countries are not allowed to vote” (Carnegie, 2009, p. 
9). A two-round majoritarian electoral system divides Bahrain into 40 small single-
member constituencies. In fact, “run off elections are held if no candidate obtains an 
absolute majority in the first round. An absolute majority is not required in the 
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second round, and voting is not compulsory” (Lahan, 2004, p. 9). However, these 40 
single member constituencies are divided according to the distribution of Sunni 
demographics in the country in order to minimize as much as possible the number of 
Shia winning candidates. The upper chamber is not included in the electoral law 
since its members are appointed by the King, and the speaker of the National 
Assembly is chosen from this appointed council. The National Assembly can issue a 
law only when it is approved by the majority of the two chambers and ratified by the 
King. The electoral law, which favors the Sunni candidates, empowers the appointed 
council, diminishes the jurisdiction of the elected council, and grants the King 
absolute rights and power. It demonstrates the electoral institutionalization of 
authoritarianism in Bahrain.   
“The weakening of the parliament by the appointment of a superior council, 
along with the gerrymandering designed to ensure Sunni dominance, spurred the 
Shiaa to boycott the 2002 parliamentary and municipal elections” (Wehrey, 2013, p. 
119). Moreover, the arrest of Abed Al-Hadi Al-Khawaja, a prominent human rights 
activist, in 2004, re-launched the demonstrations that the security forces crushed 
through violence.  
The question of joining the parliamentary elections in 2006 split the Shia 
community. Al-Haq party categorically refused to participate in a rigged electoral 
game with pre-determined winners. On the other side, Al-Wifaq advocated 
participating in the elections acknowledging that they can still win seats given the 
size of their electoral base. They thus participated with the aim of changing politics 
from within, and managed to win 17 out of 40 seats, but did not hold the majority to 
pass the laws that they desire. And even if they managed to win the majority of seats, 
laws approved by Parliament should be also endorsed by the upper chamber and then 
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ratified by the King. Hence, the authoritarian regime and Sunni domination are well 
embedded in the Bahraini constitution. 
Al-Wifaq party was portrayed by the Shia community as helpless since it 
could not promulgate any new law granting them their basic rights during its four-
year parliamentary term. Yet, the Shia voted for them again during the 2010 
elections despite all the accusations and disappointment, granting them 18 seats out 
of 40. They supported Al-Wifaq party to highlight their frustration against the Sunni 
regime, which continued to arrest and pursue them.   
The existence of parliamentary elections does not imply that the political 
system is democratic. In Bahrain, legislative power is vested in the King and the 
National Assembly. Any law or decision taken by parliament should be approved by 
the King in order to become effective. Additionally, the King nullified the power of 
the elected body by appointing a superior chamber to prevent the promulgation of 
laws that could break his authoritarian rule in case the Shia won majority in 
parliamentary elections. 
The institutionalization of authoritarianism is also illustrated in the cabinet 
appointments. The council of ministers is not formed based on the result of the 
parliamentary elections. The Prime Minister and the ministers are instead appointed 
by the King; and the majority, especially the key ministries (like defense, oil, interior 
and foreign affairs ministries) are assigned to members from the Al-Khalifa royal 
family. The appointed Prime Minister is not allowed to form his own cabinet, he can 
only propose some ministers; and the King has the sole power in selecting the names. 
Hence, all executive decisions are dictated by the King who represents the head of 
the state and controls political life. Therefore, the royal family represented by the 
King should approve all decisions issued by political institutions, whether legislative 
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or executive, which safeguards the authoritarian regime. 
 
3.5. Military and Judiciary Authoritarian Institutions 
In addition to the implementation of authoritarian measures in the legislative 
and executive branches, other institutions are also used to institutionalize 
authoritarian rule. The Bahraini Defense Forces (BDF) were granted wide-ranging 
authority with the issuance of the Decree Law on State Security Measures. Due to 
the constant protests organized by the Shia opposition, the royal family decided to 
employ Sunni loyal forces, not necessarily formed by Bahrainis, in the military. The 
loyal Armed Forces obey the King’s orders and support his regime by controlling 
and suppressing the continuous protests led by Shia. The regime is aware that a 
military formed from Shia or neutral citizens would not obey violent instructions of 
the authoritarian ruling family. This explains the employment of pro-regime 
population in the army. Hence, Sunnis from Syria, Jordan, Pakistan, Yemen, and 
Sudan were naturalized and given employment in the armed forces. Additionally, all 
the military officers are from the royal family or Sunni tribes. One of the major 
reasons that triggered protests against the regime was the high unemployment rate 
among the Shia citizens. They blamed the government for naturalizing more than 
10,000 non-Bahraini Sunnis to fill vacant military positions instead of employing 
native Bahrainis (Al-Murshed, 2013). The government, in turn, refutes these 
accusations. The Information Minister Mohammed Abdel Ghaffar declared that 
"these jobs are open to any citizen according to their merits" (Bahrain Center for 
Human Rights, 2006).   
The judicial body does not differ from other authoritarian institutions since 
the ruling family is well represented in it to control decisions, verdicts, and appeals. 
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The judiciary institution is divided into two main branches: Shari’a Law Courts, 
managing the status of Muslims in the country and Civil Law Courts, applying and 
interpreting the laws, and dealing with criminal, commercial, and civil issues (Joyce, 
2012, p. 125). The King appoints all the judges within the two branches. The Law on 
State Security Measures allows the judiciary to establish an additional branch, the 
special military courts and trials for “Bahrainis caught up in the national safety 
dragnet” (Human Rights Watch, 2012, p. 2). These courts lack independence and 
impartiality; their main obligation is to arrest and torture protestors, especially Shia 
citizens opposing the regime. “The arrested protestors were frequently unable to 
communicate with counsel, were not able to testify in their own defense, and were 
subject to physical abuse” (Human Rights Watch, 2012, p. 3).  
 
3.6. Class Structure 
The Bahraini movement was initiated in response to (1) the suspension of 
parliament and the constitution, (2) the high unemployment rate, and most 
importantly (3) the discrimination based on sectarian and social bases. In fact, 
Bahraini society is divided into four hierarchical classes created by authoritarian rule 
that penetrates the institutions, the political life, and even Bahraini social structure. 
Class A constitutes the central branch of Al-Khalifa family. It enjoys all the political 
and economic privileges, and dominates official positions. These rich sheikhs have 
ruled the entire country since the 1780s and have made considerable fortunes through 
the expansion of commerce and the development of agricultural lands. “Out of 18 
members in the cabinet in 1996, nine were from Al-Khalifa family, holding all 
sovereign-related offices” (Dabrowska, 1997, p. 5).  
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Class B citizens are merchant families with long-standing ties to Al-Khalifa 
family. They enjoy some privileges and are being granted some important official 
positions. These families used to control the pearl market and contribute to the 
economy of the island (Lawson, 1989, p. 7). Class C Bahrainis are ordinary Sunni 
citizens who support the rule of Al-Khalifa family and the privileges granted to the 
merchants. They enjoy a regular middle-level life without any kind of discrimination. 
Poor Sunni citizens from Syria, Yemen, Jordan, and many other Muslim countries 
were brought to Bahrain and were naturalized to increase the percentage of Sunnis in 
the country. However, class D constitutes all the Shia population suffering from the 
unjust discriminatory rule of the Sunni Al-Khalifa authoritarian regime. “The Shia of 
Bahrain are banned from senior positions in Foreign, Defense, Interior, and Justice 
Ministries and have been sidelined in service industries such as Health, Transport, 
Water, and Electricity” (Dabrowska, 1997, p. 75). “If you do not have a college or 
high school degree, but if you are a Sunni, you can always find a job in the military 
or the police, but Shias simply cannot” (Zill, 2012). Such discrimination and 
intolerance caused the sectarian division and the long-lasting revolts against the 
marginalization of the entire Shia community.  
 
3.7. Lack of Mutual Recognition and the Absence of Autonomy 
The nature of authoritarianism in Bahrain has caused much distrust between 
Sunni and Shia citizens. The ruling family demonized the Shia by emphasizing that 
the protestors are taking orders from Tehran and are being controlled by the Iranian 
regime that wants to dominate the Bahraini Island. This exacerbated the relations 
between Shia and Sunni Bahrainis. The anti-Shiite strategy heightened Sunni 
anxiety, which views the Shia majority in Bahrain as a threat to their existence in the 
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country. At the same time, this sectarian discrimination frustrated the Shia 
population, which increased their protests and demands. “The government played the 
sectarian card on several occasions to justify its pressure and discrimination against 
the Shia citizens” (International Crisis Group, 2005, p. 12). The government aimed at 
enlarging the gap and creating tensions between the two sects to demonstrate that 
Sunni citizens refuse Iranian influence and manipulation over Bahraini Shia 
population. “Dozens of interviews conducted with Sunni Bahrainis express their 
views advocating the regime’s story and approving the disloyalty of the Shia 
Bahrainis” (International Crisis Group, 2005, p. 12). The regime’s agenda succeeded 
in creating deep divisions between the two sects and the complete absence of mutual 
recognition and mutual acceptance of each other’s rights and demands.  
On the other hand, during the 1980s, at the beginning of the protests, the Shia 
citizens admitted that they were influenced by Iran and aimed at being re-affiliated 
with the Persian regime. They however acknowledged that this affiliation does not 
satisfy their demands. They are proud Bahraini citizens looking for their basic needs 
of representation, co-existence, justice, and equality. They emphasize that their 
positive relation with Tehran does not imply or indicate their disloyalty to their 
country and to the ruling family. “To express their loyalty to the State, in 2005, the 
Shia opposition urged the protestors to display only the Bahraini national flag” 
(Joyce, 2012, p. 127).  
The sovereign state of Bahrain was never autonomous due to the continuous 
intervention of several countries in its government decisions and opposition parties’ 
actions. Saudi Arabia is perceived as the patron of the island due to the economic 
dependence of the Bahraini economy on Riyadh’s support. In fact, Saudi Arabia is 
the biggest contributor to Bahraini’s banking system. To improve the bonds between 
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these two countries, a bridge that connects Saudi Arabia to Bahrain was constructed. 
Additionally, a vast amount of Bahraini revenues come from an offshore oil well 
located in the maritime boarders between Saudi Arabia and Bahrain, on which they 
both share sovereignty. However, “it is entirely operated by ARAMCO, a Saudi oil 
company. It pays back 50 percent of its profit to the Bahraini government” (Louer, 
2013, p. 252).  
Bahrain relies on US protection, demonstrating the American presence on its 
territory. The island “hosts the headquarters of the US Navy’s Fifth Fleet” (Louer, 
2013, p. 252). The United States indirectly mentioned, through its humanitarian 
organizations, that it was not satisfied with the violent practices of the Bahraini 
armed forces. However, it did not alter its foreign policy towards Bahrain or imposed 
the settlement of democracy, justice, and human rights due to the facilities that are 
being granted by the ruling family. The American government does not directly 
intervene in the domestic affairs of the Bahraini government, instead, it leads from 
outside through its exceptional coalition and unique relation with Saudi Arabia. 
Hence, the United States maintains a special relation with Bahrain and all the GCC 
countries due to major interests in the region. 
During the 1970s and 1980s, Iran wanted to re-conquer the island and bring it 
back under its sphere of influence, did not succeed however. Instead, it built up a 
strong relation with the Shia community and opposition parties in Bahrain. However, 
this special and strong relation does not imply that Iran controlled and launched all 
protests against the government. During the 1990s, Tehran adjusted its relationship 
with the GCC countries and certified that it is not collaborating with the Bahraini 
opposition. Nonetheless, Iran enjoys imposing its power over any country, especially 
these from the GCC to counter-balance the Saudi-American power in the region. 
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Saudi Arabia accuses Iran for influencing and supporting the Shia opposition not 
only to break Iran’s power, but also to restrain the Shia in Bahrain from achieving 
their rights. If the revolution in Bahrain succeeds, Saudi Arabia fears the spread of 
Shia opposition movements in the rest of the GCC countries, starting by the collapse 
of its own regime. It hence keeps on mentoring and controlling the situation in 
Bahrain.  
 
3.8. Conclusion  
According to the Bahraini constitution, the King, as the head of the state with 
ultimate jurisdiction over all Bahraini institutions, controls the entire political sphere. 
A study conducted by Carnegie Endowment for International Peace in 2008 criticizes 
the high level of authoritarianism in Bahrain. Additionally, the King has the right to 
veto, amend, and ratify the laws passed by the National Assembly. The King 
appoints and dismisses the Prime Minister, the Cabinet, the Speaker of the House, 
and the Parliament. He is also the “commander in Chief of the armed forces, the 
chairman of the Higher Judicial Council, and he appoints judges” (Carnegie, 2008, p. 
3). This authoritarian culture is also reflected in the Bahraini social life. The 
“superior” sect formed by the ruling family and the Sunni citizens demonizes and 
rejects the recognition of the “inferior” sect. The next chapter describes the events of 
the Bahraini Arab Spring, the response of the regime, and Saudi Arabia’s 
intervention. It also analyzes the best viable power-sharing case scenario suitable to 
Bahraini’s deeply divided society.  
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Chapter Four 
Beyond the Bahraini Uprising 
 
4.1. Introduction 
The marginalized population of Bahrain has never missed a chance in raising 
their requests demanding an end to discrimination and the establishment of social 
justice. Influenced by the successful uprisings in Tunisia and Egypt, the Bahraini 
opposition launched its most significant non-violent revolution in February 2011. 
However, their small protests, which were mostly led by Shia activists, never 
threatened the authoritarian regime. However, after witnessing the victorious fall of 
the authoritarian regimes in Tunis and Cairo, the Bahraini citizens from the two sects 
– Shia and Sunni – got inspired by the Arab Spring movement and insisted on 
pursuing their long-lasting demands. The latest uprising was different. The Bahrainis 
constantly demanded for changes but never protested like this before: “in 2011, the 
Pearl Roundabout cross-sectarian uprising was a watershed in the political life of 
Bahrain” (Wehrey, 2013, p. 116). These peaceful demonstrations were faced by a 
predicted violent response led by Bahraini, GCC, and Saudi Armed Forces.  
This chapter explains the evolution of the Bahraini Spring in addition to the 
government, regional, and international responses. It also describes the move away 
from authoritarianism by presenting the best viable regime for the Bahraini deeply 
divided society, including the three previously explained complementary concepts – 
institutional engineering, mutual recognition, and autonomy.  
 
 47 
4.2. The 2011 Bahraini Uprising  
The Bahraini government demonized the protestors of 2011 as agents of the 
Iranian regime. The revolution was consequently portrayed as a pure sectarian fight 
between the Sunni regime, supported by Saudi Arabia, against a Shia rebellion 
manipulated by Iran. To counter the regime’s attempt to manufacture a sectarian rift, 
the protestors raised the following slogan to show that they represented cross-
sectarian Bahraini citizens demanding justice, freedom, and democracy: “No Shiites, 
No Sunnis, only Bahrainis” (Abdulla, 2011, p. 161). King Hamad Al-Khalifa 
refrained from using violence and tried to accommodate the protestors by 
“announcing a gift of 1,000 Bahraini Dinars for each family, creating 20,000 jobs, 
constructing 50,000 new housing units, and appointing new ministers” (Wehrey, 
2013, p. 125). But from previous experience, the citizens were confident that the 
government was not willing to execute any reform. They hence organized open 
demonstrations at the Pearl Roundabout on 14 February 2011.  
The unimplemented reforms, the systemic discrimination, and the successful 
uprisings in Tunisia and Egypt inspired the majority of Bahraini citizens to revolt. 
Formed by Sunni and Shia activists, and especially young citizens, the peaceful 
demonstrations made the Pearl Roundabout their iconic place for open protests until 
their demands are met; they even settled tents and camped out for overnights. A fifth 
of Bahraini citizens participated in the demonstrations across the country expressing 
their desire to topple the regime and establish social justice (Al Jazeera, 2014). 
However, in response to these demonstrations, the Bahraini government banned all 
sorts of gatherings and deployed its armed forces to end these revolts. The 
homogeneous loyal military stood by the regime. “On 17 February 2011, the 
Bahraini Security Forces closed in on sleeping protestors, using rubber bullets, 
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birdshot, and tear gas” (Wehrey, 2013, p. 122). This so-called bloody Thursday 
resulted in the death of more than three hundred activists, and to the detention and 
torture of a significant number of protestors. In response, the Shia Wifaq party pulled 
all its members from Parliament refusing to deal with a government that intentionally 
kills its own citizens. However, this bloody response did not deter protestors from 
pursuing their demands. “About 50,000 citizens participated in the funeral of the 
victims and marched throughout the capital” (Davidson, 2013, p. 3). On 25 February 
2011, 40 percent of the Bahraini population protested in front of the Parliament 
demanding the resignation of the elected members that could not represent them and 
were incapable of issuing laws that protect their rights (Abdulla, 2011, p. 163).  
The ruling family was divided between those who wanted an immediate and 
violent response to crush the demonstrations, and others that advocated a peaceful 
solution in which they would accommodate the protestors’ demands. Since violence 
did not hinder the cross-sectarian movement from roaming the streets and demanding 
change, the Crown Prince pushed for the implementation of some reforms hoping to 
contain and end the rebellion. The King consequently ordered the release of several 
political detainees and dismissed some ministers (Erlich, 2012). Nevertheless, the 
protestors could not trust the regime and its pretended reforms, which were not 
implemented and were not meant to grant them their rights. The demonstrations 
therefore continued during the month of March and their demands escalated. At the 
beginning of the 2011 protests, the Bahrainis wanted the establishment of a new 
constitution that only permits fair parliamentary elections. But then, the violent 
response of the regime, which resulted in the death and torture of many protestors, 
pushed the majority of the Bahraini citizens to start calling for the removal of the Al-
Khalifa King and his Prime Minister. The ruling family declared that the protestors 
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had crossed the red line in their demands of removing the King. It hence 
acknowledged that minor reforms would not accommodate the revolution and 
approved that the only way to terminate the uprising resides in going back to a 
violent crackdown.  
Saudi Arabia pressured the regime to adopt the violent strategy; it was not 
satisfied with the peaceful response of accommodating the protestors. In their media 
and official speeches, Riyadh also demonized the revolution and pictured it as a coup 
organized and manipulated by Iran to annex the islands of Bahrain to its territory. 
However, this accusation was not only aimed at counter-balancing Iranian power in 
the region. Instead, Saudi Arabia was mainly concerned about the expansion of the 
protests into its own backyard. The collapse of the monarchy in Bahrain could have a 
snowball effect that would threaten other authoritarian Gulf regimes, and revolutions 
might take place in the rest of the Gulf, especially Saudi Arabia. Therefore, the Gulf 
Cooperation Council (GCC) decided to deploy its “Peninsula Shield Forces”, led by 
Saudi Arabia, in Bahrain on 14 March 2011 to end the uprising violently. The troops 
crossed into the island through the bridge that links Saudi Arabia to Bahrain. Since 
the island is part of the GCC, all the other members were expected to back it up 
when it requests support. The next day, 15 March 2011, the King declared a state of 
emergency in the kingdom for three months. This decree did not hinder Bahraini 
citizens from marching towards the Saudi Arabia Embassy to show their 
dissatisfaction with its military intervention. This demonstration, along with other 
protests in universities and across the country, were again faced by violent and 
bloody responses. Thousands of protestors were killed, detained, or tortured. Doctors 
who helped the protestors, journalists who highlighted the cruel actions of the ruling 
family, lawyers who defended the detainees, and Members of Parliament from the 
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Shia sect were arrested, with some of them dying in custody (Zill, 2012). 
Additionally, on 18 May 2011, the significant Pearl Roundabout monument was 
removed and replaced by traffic lights to avoid the assemblage of protestors in this 
symbolic location. The Bahraini Forces destroyed some Shia mosques at the pretext 
that they were illegally built. They also banned the two main Shia political parties, 
and their members were arrested. The clashes, torture, arrests, and discrimination did 
not restrain the majority of the citizens from continuing to demand justice and 
equality. Nevertheless, the 2011 revolution, which threatened the Bahraini ruling 
family, ultimately fell apart and was put down by the beginning of a national 
dialogue. Later, to corroborate his positive intension, the King responded to the 
request of the moderate Crown Prince, Prince Salman Bin Hamad Bin Issa Al-
Khalifa, who refused the use of violence response, and headed the dialogue 
committee. However, the dialogue sessions did not last for a long time and did not 
generate any solution due to the unchanged violent and discriminated response of the 
government, like the arrest of a leading official from Al Wifaq, the main Shia 
opposition party.  
 
4.3. Foreign Suppression of the Revolution 
The Bahraini uprising was suppressed by the government and especially by 
the intervention of foreign countries. Saudi Arabia feared Shia domination in 
Bahrain, which might extend the revolution and the unrest to its territory and the rest 
of the Gulf states. It justified its refusal to accept any reforms by blaming the 
movement on Iran and depicting it as being manipulated by Tehran. Given that the 
Bahraini armed forces could not face the revolution on its own, Riyadh led the 
deployment of 1,500 troops from the GCC forces; which crashed down the uprising. 
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Bahrain is also the home of the US Fifth Navy Fleet and the latter holds a 
special relation with Saudi Arabia. Therefore, it could not promote its values of 
freedom, democracy, and social justice in Bahrain as in Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, and 
Syria. The US indirectly criticized the violent response of the Bahraini armed Forces, 
which resulted in the death of a large number of citizens; it however never 
encouraged regime change. The US only promoted the establishment of rounds of 
dialogue to accommodate the revolts and the demands of the Shia population. 
Bahrain hence clearly exposed the double standards of US foreign policy because 
American’s strategic interest prevailed over American values in Bahrain. The 
strategic location of Bahrain secures the passage of oil from the Gulf to the US and 
helps to keep an eye on Iran. Therefore, the US values its special relation with 
Bahrain. Accordingly, it would not profit from promoting democracy and freedom in 
such a strategic country.  
Nor did the media and the international community properly highlight the 
bloody response of the government. Only a few international NGOs, like Amnesty 
International, Human Rights Watch, and International Crisis Group shed light on the 
violent reaction of the military (Human Rights Watch, 2012). They however did not 
mobilize the international community to put an end to these violations. Additionally, 
many Gulf states sponsor international media channels such as CNN, Al-Arabia, Sky 
News, and Al-Jazeera. This prevents them from transparently broadcasting and 
criticizing the regime’s violent and non-humanitarian response. These politicized 
channels helped in sustaining the authoritarian regime in Bahrain (Brynen, Moore, 
Salloukh, & Zahar, 2012). They carried the regime’s message pretending to face the 
Iranian conspiracy. “Saudi-owned Al Arabiya channel reflected the official point of 
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view, condemning activists of being Iranian proxies and accusing demonstrators of 
being armed” (Hashem, 2012). 
All aforementioned reasons contributed the crushing of the Bahraini uprising. 
However, this did not silence the opposition. Small opposition movements are still 
being organized, especially on the yearly anniversary of the revolution. “The 
protesters marched in Manama on 14 February 2012, trying to revive the revolution 
and retake the Pearl Roundabout, since renamed al-Farouq Junction” (McEvers, 
2012), but they were again faced by bullets and tear gas. However, for now, the 
uprising appears to be over. The ruling family is still in power, enjoying the same 
authoritarian rule, just like nothing ever happened” (McEvers, 2012). Nonetheless, 
the discriminated group will not rest and will eventually, in the long run, move away 
from authoritarian rule. The next section hence proposes the best viable power-
sharing regime for Bahrain. 
 
4.4. The Institutionalization of Power-Sharing 
The uprising was crushed and the demands of the protestors, especially the 
Shia opposition, were never realized. But, the activists and the discriminated 
majority will not rest until they achieve justice. However, when the dictatorship 
collapses, the replacement of the authoritarian regime should be well planned since a 
simple majoritarian democracy will not solve the problem of a deeply divided 
society; the minority will then face the issue of marginalization. Therefore, as 
discussed in Chapter 2, the only viable democratic solution for Bahrain is the 
establishment of a power-sharing regime that will reassure the representation of the 
Shia majority as well as the Sunni minority.  
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A specialized committee with members from the two sects should agree on a 
constitution that implements the values of democracy based on a power-sharing 
prototype. This constitution should take into consideration Bahrain’s geopolitical 
location. In fact, given that Bahrain is a member of the Gulf Cooperation Council 
and the Al-Khalifa family ruled Bahrain for decades, the King cannot be overthrown. 
Therefore, a democratic constitutional monarchy should be put in place. A king from 
the Al-Khalifa family would be considered as the honorary head of the state with 
limited political power. The constitution should also describe the parliamentary 
system that will be established in Bahrain, with the Prime Minister being the political 
head of the state. 
The new regime will be based on a liberal consociational power-sharing 
model that accommodates all the groups in a deeply divided country.  Since Bahrain 
is a small country in which citizens are divided into two sects only, the formation of 
federal rule would be impossible. In fact, a two-federation state will cause more 
problems and will further divide the country causing dual competition and leading to 
eventual separation. If the “communal groups are not geographically concentrated, 
autonomy can also be arranged on a non-territorial basis” (Lijphart, 2004, p. 105). 
However, decentralization is essential and each sect should be allowed to possess its 
own schools and mosques. “Decentralization helps in improving the channels of 
citizen participation and political accountability. It also allows for a more responsive, 
and thus effective, government allocation of public goods to a diverse citizenry” 
(Daughters & Harper, 2007, p. 215). Hence, further autonomy should be given to 
municipalities and mayors, which allows them to focus on the demands of their 
community. This decentralization process will stop discrimination against a certain 
sect and focus on improving the citizen’s conditions. 
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4.4.1. Legislative Authority 
The legislative authority under the authoritarian regime was formed by the 
King and the National Assembly. This assembly was bicameral, created by an 
appointed Consultative Council and an elected Chamber of Deputies, the first being 
superior with law-making jurisdictions, while the power of the lower elected body 
was constrained. After the suspension of the parliament in 1975, the Bahraini citizens 
were allowed to vote three times in 2002, 2006, and 2010. However, these elections 
were based on a tailored, unfair, and discriminated electoral law that gerrymandered 
the districts to favor the Sunni candidates. “The elections became part of the 
institutional ensemble organized by the regime to avoid democratization and 
reproduce authoritarianism” (Brynen et al., 2012, p. 147). Hence, the royal family 
employs and shapes the pre-determined elections in order to stay in power. In fact, 
these elections are designed to favor the pro-regime contestants and to also “absorb 
the opposition activity into the regime’s institutional framework” (Bryen et al., 2012, 
p. 158). The four-year term of the current Bahraini parliament ends in 2014, and the 
opposition was planning on boycotting the polls since no reforms were made and 
their demand for issuing a new fair electoral law was not met.  
A move away from authoritarianism entails establishing a bicameral 
legislative system, with Shura or Consultative Council being the appointed upper 
house and Majlis Al Nuwwab or Chamber of Deputies being the elected lower house. 
The new electoral law should grant the lower house the right in making all 
legislations. As for the upper house, it should enjoy limited power. Its role should be 
restricted to only taking a second look at the laws issued by the lower house that 
require the amendment of the constitution. However, if the two chambers disagree on 
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a certain law, the opinion of the elected body should prevail. In other words, the 
upper chamber should be similar to England’s House of Lords. 
 
Upper House 
 The seats of the Bahraini upper house should be equally divided (half Shia 
and half Sunni) with a mutual veto right. This equal division guarantees the rights of 
the Sunni minority and allows their engagement in the major decisions. The 
appointed upper chamber tends to be the smaller of the two legislative bodies. 
Additionally, its representatives serve more time than the elected members, but have 
less power. Since the Bahraini population is small, the Consultative Council should 
be composed of 30 members only, 15 Shia and 15 Sunni. This chamber has a very 
limited role in a parliamentary system. In fact, it cannot veto all the decision taken by 
the lower house and cannot initiate any budgetary legislation. It only has an advisory 
role of revising and vetoing the laws or decrees that need to amend the constitution. 
It can also propose the amendment of some other laws, but the lower chamber can 
refuse its suggestions. The upper house is appointed by the prime minister, and its 
members are usually experts or distinguished Bahraini citizens. The members of 
Consultative Council can serve for eight years since their role is very limited. 
However, the equal seats division and the mutual veto right can paralyze the country 
and create a slow decision-making resulting sometimes in a deadlock. However, such 
division ensures that the minority will not be trampled. Therefore, the risk of 
reaching a stalemate is better than causing the marginalization of the minority.   
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Lower House 
   The Representative Council should be granted more powers than the upper 
house, as per the constitution, since it is the sole directly elected body; it can even 
supersede the upper house. It usually contains more members than the lower house 
and enjoys a shorter term. Bahrain is a small country with 1,336,254 citizens 
according to the 2014 World Population Review; hence the number of elected 
members of parliament should relatively be small. The Bahraini population, males 
and females above 18 years old, should be granted the right to elect 50 candidates 
according to the proportional representation (PR) model. Chapter 2 argued that 
liberal consociationalism is the best viable solution for a deeply divided country. It 
puts in place a fair electoral law, based on proportional representation, in which 
citizens can vote for the party they prefer. Hence, liberal rule will not eliminate 
differences between Sunnia and Shias, but it would put away all the major divisions 
that cause deeply rooted conflicts.  
The liberal consociational model tries to get rid of all the divisions in the 
society by forming a homogeneous parliament with cross-sectarian coalitions. It does 
not allocate a quota for each sect; it instead applies the closed party-list of 
proportional representation, with Bahrain considered one electoral district. Each 
party forms a closed list and orders its candidates by order of priority. And since no 
quota is required, cross-sectarian coalitions will be established, and new non-
sectarian parties may emerge. Hence, liberal consociationalism focuses on interests 
rather than identities. As explained in chapter 2, D’Hondt’s electoral model provides 
the best proportional representation law because it spreads the allocated seats as 
evenly as possible. It allows the representation of a bigger number of parties in the 
parliament since it allocates the seats singularly, one after another. In fact, the party’s 
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total votes is divided by a certain pre-determined divisor that increases as the party 
wins more seats, which allows parties with lower total votes to also win seats. This 
system ensures that parties, and not identities, that accumulated a significant 
percentage during the election are entitled to seats in the parliament. The below table 
shows all the parties in Bahrain
4
: 
Name and Affiliation of the Current Bahraini Parties: 
Al – Asalah Pro-government, Sunni Islamist 
Al – Menbar Islamic Society Pro-government, Sunni Islamist 
Al – Meethaq Pro-government, Secular 
Economist Bloc Pro-government, Secular 
National Justice Movement Pro-government, Secular 
Al – Wefaq National Islamic Society Opposition, Shia Islamist 
Progressive Democratic Tribune Opposition, Secular 
National Democratic Action Society Opposition, Secular 
Nationalist Democratic Rally Opposition, Secular 
Bahrain Freedom Movement Opposition, Unlicensed 
Haq Movement Opposition, Unlicensed 
February 14 Youth Coalition Opposition, Youth 
Shabeeba Society of Bahrain Opposition, Youth 
 
With the new power-sharing constitution and the end of the authoritarian era, 
Bahraini political parties would not be categorized anymore according to their 
sectarian affiliation. They will have to be accountable to the electorate and will have 
                                                 
4
 The name and affiliation of all the Bahraini parties were retrieved from: 
A Field Guide to Bahraini Political Parties. (2011) The Telegraph. http://www.telegraph.co.uk/ 
    news/8334582/A-FIELD-GUIDE-TO-BAHRAIN-POLITICAL-PARTIES.html 
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to address people with new socio-economic plans and objectives. Additionally, the 
closed list proportional representation model will lead to the formation of new cross-
sectarian coalitions between the parties that have common goals. Therefore, the 
sectarian division between Sunni and Shia would not be a problem anymore because 
their parties will be united under the liberal consociational closed party list. 
Moreover, this electoral law will drive the formation of additional secular parties 
with non-political views, like the green party, or a party that empowers women.  
 
4.4.2. Executive Authority 
During the authoritarian rule of Al-Khalifa family, the Prime Minister and the 
ministers were appointed by the King; and the majority, especially the key ministries 
(like defense, oil, interior and foreign affairs ministries) were assigned to members 
from the royal family.  
In a parliamentary system, the prime minister is the head of the government 
and the political representative of the country. The prime minister is elected by the 
lower house of the legislative authority, hence the party or the coalition that won the 
majority of parliamentary seats democratically chooses its representative to fill in the 
position of the head of the government. The elected prime minister chooses the 
ministers that will form the cabinet and requests a vote of confidence from the lower 
house. The executive body is hence formed by the prime minister and the cabinet 
that were given the confidence vote; its role is to execute the laws legislated by the 
parliament and to deal with the day-to-day administrative activities of the country. 
The executive branch will be reflecting the cross-sectarian coalitions that were 
formed in the lower house of the parliament.   
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4.4.3. Judicial Body 
The judicial body should be an independent branch that applies the laws, 
interprets them, and implements the constitution. During the authoritarian regime, all 
the judges were appointed by the King and were specifically chosen from the royal 
family. The judicial body was divided into three branches: the Shari’a Law Courts 
that deal with the status of Muslims, the Civil Law Courts that are responsible of all 
the remaining issues, and the Special Courts that prosecute citizens involved in 
counter-regime movements. However, a new structure should be put in place. In fact, 
the Shari’a Law should be restricted to each sect and should not be considered as a 
section in the official judicial branch. As part of the decentralization plan, each sect 
should be able to solve its own religious problems according to its own 
Shari’a/courts. Hence, all the laws that deal with Sunni or Shia status should be 
affiliated under the jurisdiction of the Shari’a of each sect. As well, the extra-legal 
Special Courts established by the authoritarian rule to prosecute the protestors should 
be closed. All citizens should be granted freedom of speech and should be able to 
express their opinion peacefully, without harming the others or causing any trouble. 
If they do not respect the law, they would then be subject to normal procedure under 
the civil law courts.  
The Bahraini judicial system should hence be divided into two sections: the 
Council of State and the Civil Law Court. Since Bahrain cannot be divided into 
federational districts, it cannot have a federation council that represents all the 
federal entities of the country. This entity can be replaced by a simple judiciary 
council called “Council of State” representing the two sects. Its role consists in 
approving constitutional amendments to ensure that the minority rights will always 
be protected. It is also the highest and final authority that can interpret the 
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constitution. The other section of the judicial branch is the regular Civil Law court 
that deals with criminal and civil matters. This branch should be completely 
independent and its judges should not be affiliated to any political party. 
 
4.4.4. Military Forces 
During the rule of the authoritarian government in Bahrain, the military was 
one of the most corrupt branches. Only Sunni officials – even non-Bahrainis from 
Yemen, Jordan, Syria, and Pakistan, who showed their complete loyalty to the royal 
family – were granted the Bahraini citizenship and hired in the military. Moreover, 
the military’s officer corps was mostly composed of Al-Khalifa family members and 
some loyal Sunni tribes. In the past, few Shia citizens were recruited but were not 
granted official positions. Nonetheless, when the demonstrations started in the 1990s, 
and the primary task of the armed forces became the suppression of these protestors, 
the Shia representation in the army completely disappeared. During the Bahraini 
uprising, these security forces defended the regime without any qualms. The coup-
proofing strategy of only recruiting Sunnis in the military immunized the 
authoritarian regime against the Shia internal threat (Louer, 2013, p. 245). Hence, 
avoiding the recruitment of Shia in the four main security agencies: “the Bahrain 
Defense Force (BDF), the National Guard (NG), the Public Security Forces (PSF), 
and the National Security Agency (NSA)” succeeded in repressing the regime-
threatening uprising (Louer, 2013, p. 246).   
However, in a democratic power-sharing system, the hired forces should be 
recruited according to their merit. The authoritarian government claimed that the 
military needed more forces, but due to the limited number of Bahraini citizens that 
were not even applying to fill in the vacant positions, it was obliged to hire non-
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Bahraini people. This excuse was not approved by the discriminated Shia majority 
that was looking for jobs in all the fields and was complaining from the high 
unemployment rate. Therefore, the new democratic government should give the 
opportunity to all the Bahraini citizens to apply for vacant positions in the military. 
And if Bahraini citizens could not fill these positions, the recruitment of foreigners 
would then be justified. The composition of the forces does not require being 
proportional to reflect the sectarian percentage. In fact, the military should be 
considered as an independent, autonomous, and unified player. Therefore the armed 
forces are supposed to be recruited based on their meritocracy. During the rule of 
authoritarianism, “the Bahraini security apparatus lacked coherence. Several bodies 
held similar functions, pointing the lack of coherence of the security apparatus” 
(Louer, 2013, p. 253). When Bahrain moves away from the rule of authoritarianism, 
it should re-structure and unify its military and discard the division between royal 
forces that protect the ruling family from internal threat on one hand, and regular 
army on the other hand. In fact, the military must be regarded as a separate, unified, 
and distinct entity.  
 
4.5. Mutual Recognition 
  “Culture is an irreducible aspect of politics. How can the proponents of 
cultural recognition bring forth their claims in a public forum in which their cultures 
have been excluded or demeaned for centuries?” (Tully, 1995, p. 56). The Shia in 
Bahrain were obliged to accept Sunni institutions, history, language, and culture. 
They were marginalized and rejected by the government and the constitution; they 
were never allowed to express their opinion and culture. Hence the issue that Tully 
addresses is “Can a modern constitution recognize and accommodate cultural 
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diversity?” To do so, the modern constitution cannot be transported from one country 
to another because it will not completely fit the culture of the new nation. Therefore, 
to establish an adequate customized constitution for a democratic Bahrain, 
discussions among the two sects and the liberal and secular parties should be 
organized, “in which each speaker gives its input and its demands” (Tully, 1995, p. 
6). However, the constitution can never accommodate and answer the entire demands 
of all the groups present in Bahrain or any other divided society. Out of this realistic 
answer, Tully argues that liberty and cultural recognition are limited by the necessity 
of the formation of democratic and impartial institutions and the maintenance of 
social order. Hence, there is no appropriate form of constitutional recognition of 
cultural diversity since the constitution and the institutions can never accommodate 
all the cultures. Rather, mutual recognition across sects should be established to 
avoid the collapse of the institutions. An open dialogue that describes the history, the 
culture, and the fears of each group should be conducted between the Shia and the 
Sunni in Bahrain in order to accept and understand each one’s point of view.  
Free and open conversations that raise diversity awareness will break the wall 
between the two sects and will let them discover the particularity of the other and see 
their image in the eyes of different groups. Therefore, the absolute cultural 
recognition that cannot be achieved should be replaced by a sense of mutual 
recognition between the Shia and the Sunni. “The mutual recognition of the cultures 
of citizens engenders allegiance and unity for two reasons. Citizens have a sense of 
belonging to, and identification with a constitutional association in so far as, first, 
they have a say in the formation and governing of the association and, second, they 
see their own cultural ways publicly acknowledged and affirmed in the basic 
institutions of their society” (Tully, 1995, p. 197-8). Therefore, even if the perfect 
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democratic and transparent constitution was put in place in Bahrain, the deeply 
divided conflict between the two sects will persist and the well-engineered 
institutions will collapse if the citizens were not involved in the formation of these 
institutions.  
 
4.6. Autonomy 
If well-engineered institutions were continuously been interrupted by foreign 
countries, they will eventually collapse because when domestic decisions become 
regionalized, the threat of civil war increases. As mentioned in chapter 2, powerful 
countries cannot expose their strengths unless they were controlling weaker strategic 
states. Additionally, no country can be isolated from the external world, but a certain 
degree of autonomy must be preserved. Bahraini autonomy or sovereignty is 
breached by two countries: Saudi Arabia and Iran. The turbulent relation between 
these two countries can contribute in the collapse of the Bahraini power-sharing 
regime. In fact, Saudi Arabia considers itself the patron of the island, it profits from 
its banking system and continuously gives orders to suppress the Shia, not only to 
counter balance Iran’s power in the region, but also to avoid the empowerment of 
their own Shia citizens. Nonetheless, Saudi Arabia will never end its intervention in 
the Bahraini domestic affairs.  
On the other side, Iran could stop manipulating the Shia in Bahrain but of 
course would always have interest in the small country especially to counter balance 
Saudi Arabia’s patronage. The intervention of both countries, each supporting one of 
the two sects in Bahrain would ruin the country and re-launch a deeply divided 
sectarian conflict. Therefore, the new power-sharing government should be aware of 
this problem and agree on a form of Finlandization whereby Bahrain retains good 
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relations with Saudi Arabia and Iran. However, Bahrain’s economy is based on Saudi 
Arabia’s cash inflow into its banking system. Also, it receives 50% of the oil revenue 
from ARAMCO, the Saudi Arabian country that extracts oil from Bahraini-Saudi 
borders. If Bahrain decides to limit its relationship with Saudi Arabia, the latter can 
easily damage the island’s economy. Hence, a tremendous challenge is facing the 
new power-sharing government in accommodating Saudi Arabia. Additionally, the 
United States of America also has interests in Bahrain, but is not considered as a 
major player in Bahrain. The island is the home of its Fifth Navy Fleet and it profits 
as well form its geopolitical strategic location to easily transport oil and to keep an 
eye on Iran. However, the US is leading from behind by delegating Saudi Arabia to 
control all the decisions made in Bahrain.  
 
4.7. Conclusion 
This chapter illustrated the big picture of how a democratic power-sharing 
model should be institutionalized and engineered in a way that solves the deeply 
divided conflict in the Bahraini society. It however does not dig into the detailed 
laws of the constitution and the branches of the government. It engineers the 
institutions to provide the essential environment for a well-structured power-sharing 
model. However, even if the institutions were perfectly structured and met the 
constitution’s requirements, they would not function without the respective 
acceptance of the citizens. The Sunni and Shia population should agree on living 
together; however this cannot be achieved unless they mutually recognize each other. 
Finally, to be able to implement the power-sharing model, a certain degree of 
autonomy should be guaranteed because any foreign intervention can create a 
conflict that might lead to the re-launch of problems between the two sects and the 
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collapse of the institutions. Hence, these three concepts – institutional engineering, 
mutual recognition, and autonomy – should come hand in hand to mark a successful 
democratic transition in Bahrain. The next chapter summarizes the main findings, 
describes the current situation in Bahrain, and explains the practical and theoretical 
lessons of the thesis to other deeply divided societies.   
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Chapter Five 
Conclusion 
 
5.1. General Findings 
  Bahrain is a deeply divided country that had witnessed continuous protests 
since 1994. The 70 percent Shia majority is complaining from discrimination and 
suppression. They are regarded as second-class citizens that do not enjoy the same 
rights as the Sunni minority. This sect is not appropriately represented. Only pro-
government Shia figures occupy official positions in the cabinet, military, and 
judiciary. The marginalized Shia population confronted the regime by forming 
opposition parties and organizing several demonstrations. They first did not request 
the overthrow of the king and the Al-Khalifa ruling family, but only wanted to set up 
a new electoral law that ensures the fair representation of their marginalized sect. 
Nevertheless, these small demonstrations did not succeed in changing any laws nor 
did they prevent discrimination against the Shia community.  
The 2011 uprising is the most threatening challenge yet to Al-Khalifa rule, 
influenced by the Arab Spring in Tunisia and Egypt. However, the Bahraini armed 
forces, backed by GCC and Saudi troops, crushed the uprising, resulting in the death 
and torture of thousands of protestors. This violent response triggered Bahrainis to 
demand a change of regime and the replacement of the ruling Al-Khalifa family. 
Alas, this cross-sectarian revolution failed in establishing a new rule that grants the 
Shia community their rights. Further discrimination and violence beg for the 
establishment of a new democratic rule in Bahrain, one that ensures a fair 
representation of the two sects. However, the establishment of a simple majoritarian 
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democracy will not solve the deeply rooted conflict, as the absolute majority will 
solely rule the country causing additional division. Therefore, the best viable regime 
for Bahrain is the creation of a power-sharing system. This thesis argues that the new 
constitution should be tailored according to the needs of the society and the cultures 
of the two sects. The institutions cannot be previously designed in another country 
and imported to Bahrain.  
Consocialtionalism is the best viable power-sharing regime that can be 
implemented in a deeply divided country. However, two types of consociationalism 
exist: corporate consociationalism and liberal consociationalism. The first was 
advanced by Arend Lijphart. It lays down a pre-fixed quota for the representation of 
each sect, which in the case of Bahrain hardens religious identification and deepens 
the conflict since the citizens will only support their own sect. On the contrary, 
liberal consociationalism aims at reducing the deeply rooted conflict. It does not pre-
determine quotas for representation. This allows the creation of additional secular 
parties and the emergence of new coalitions gathering the two sects. Liberal 
consociationalism, promoted by John McGarry and Brendan O’Leary, holds the 
same basic rules established by Lijphart but with few amendments that can solve the 
deeply rooted conflict and prevent future divisions.  
A democratic constitutional monarchy with a parliamentary system is the best 
form that suits the Bahraini’s divisions. The Al-Khalifa King will consequently 
become the honorary head of the state, and all the institutions will be established 
according to a new constitution based on the liberal consociational model. This brand 
of liberal consociationalism advocates the involvement of the two sects in the 
government institutions. It however does not set a quota except for the upper house 
of the legislative body. The legislative authority would thus be bicameral. The seats 
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of the appointed upper house are equally divided. The two sects are entitled to 
mutual veto rights and possess a very limited advisory role. The members of the 
upper house can only review and veto the laws that need to amend the constitution. 
On the other hand, the elected lower house supersedes the upper house as it is 
directly elected by Bahraini citizens, and is not based on a predetermined quota. The 
elections are conducted with a closed list proportional representation law. This 
electoral law will form new coalitions between Shia, Sunni, and secular parties, 
proposing a new non-sectarian platform. These alliances lead to cooperation between 
parties and sects, which can diminish the deeply rooted conflict. The votes are 
calculated according to d’Hondt’s model, which allocates the seats as evenly as 
possible. It allows the representation of several coalitions since the seats are 
allocated singularly, one after another. The idea is that the party’s total votes is 
divided by a certain divisor that increases as the party wins more seats, which allows 
parties with lower total votes to also win seats. Accordingly, the winning coalition 
gets the chance to form the executive body. Hence, the cabinet will also be formed 
by a set of alliances, reflecting the represented parties in the parliament. Other 
institutions, such as the military and the judiciary, should be independent and 
impartial. The vacant positions in these two bodies must be filled by Bahraini 
citizens according to a meritocratic process, rather than on sectarian affiliations.  
According to Lijphart and the corporate consociational rule, the minorities 
should be granted a “veto right”. However, this might create a slow decision process 
and institutional deadlock. Instead, the neutral Judicial Council of State reviews the 
laws and the constitutional amendments to prevent harming the minority. Moreover, 
Bahrain cannot be divided into any number of federal states due to its small size and 
because a dual division risks in separating the country. Instead, a decentralized 
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strategy should be implemented. The two sects will enjoy the establishment of their 
own schools and mosques that regulate Islamic-related issues according to the 
Shari’a. 
These liberal consociational institutions would not function properly if the 
citizens refuse to abide by them and were not able to solve their – often regime-
created – deep divisions. “Institutions are not direct causes of democratic stability, 
instead they are only indicators” (Waldner, 2009, p. 1). Hence, this thesis borrows 
Tully’s mutual recognition theory. The modern liberal consociational constitution 
should include both the demands and concerns of the Shia and Sunnis to ensure the 
successful functioning of democratic institutions. However, not all the needs of the 
two sects can be accommodated. Tully anticipates this, noting that it is almost 
impossible to establish a modern constitution that perfectly accommodates all the 
groups of a certain society. Nonetheless, to avoid the institutional collapse and the 
escalation of conflict, the concept of mutual recognition should be applied in post-
authoritarian Bahrain. People interact with others through institutions and also 
engage in various social activities. Hence, all their problems should be resolved by 
mutually recognizing the culture and history of the other sect. The Shia and Sunni 
citizens do not want to divide the country; therefore they should share their stories to 
view their image in the eyes of the other sect in order to understand their concerns. 
This free and open communication would preserve the well-engineered institutions 
and protect against the failure of the liberal consociational experiment. 
An additional concept should be added to well-engineered institutions and 
mutual recognition to avoid the collapse of such institutions and the rise of additional 
conflicts. Any weak and strategic country cannot avoid the interference of 
international and regional actors in its internal policy. Bahrain, in particular, is 
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witnessing such intervention and is not allowed to autonomously take decisions. 
Saudi Arabia controls the Bahraini economy. It is hence considered the foreign 
patron of the country that hinders its economic collapse. Moreover, Saudi Arabia 
manipulates domestic and especially military decisions because it fears the Shia 
domination of the island, which can influence its own security interests. On the other 
side, even though Iran is not behind the protests against the current authoritarian 
regime, it would always have interest in Bahrain due to its strategic geo-political 
location and at the same time, to counter-balance the Sunni Saudi Arabian 
domination of the region. Additionally, Bahrain is the home of the US Navy Fleet, it 
also allows the oil’s easy access from the Gulf countries to America, and keeps an 
eye on Iran. Therefore, the United States interferes in Bahraini decisions, but is 
playing this role from behind, leaving the lead to Saudi Arabia. When all these three 
countries decide to interfere in the Bahraini decisions and transmit their geo-political 
battles into its territory, the island’s post-authoritarian institutions will collapse. In 
other words, if the Bahraini sectarian conflict was regionalized, the democratic 
power-sharing regime is prone to collapse. Bahrain cannot prevent or stop foreign 
regional and international intervention, it is however supposed to limit this external 
interference to preserve its institutions and avoid their collapse. Hence, the 
sustainability of the democratic power-sharing regime is also determined by the 
degree of autonomy that a deeply divided society like Bahrain enjoys. 
The democratization of Bahrain will be faced by a regional constraint. In fact, 
Saudi Arabia will resist the regime change, as it fears the collapse of its own ruling 
system. However, the new Bahraini liberal consociational regime should guarantee 
the interests of both Saudi Arabia and Iran. If the interests of these two countries 
were met, they would become more flexible in approving the democratization of 
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Bahrain. Therefore, to preserve its autonomy and to avoid regional and international 
interference, Bahrain should maintain a Finlandization strategy reflected in the 
neutrality of its foreign policy.  
Thus, this thesis takes Bahrain as a case study to illustrate the importance of 
the three concepts – institutional engineering, mutual recognition, and autonomy – in 
the establishment of a successful democratic power-sharing regime. These three 
complementary concepts should be implemented in any country encountering a 
deeply divided problem to ensure its stability.  
  
5.2. The Particularity of Bahrain 
Bahrain is the only constitutional monarchy in the Gulf that has witnessed a 
serious revolution that could have toppled its regime. Three facts justify why only 
Bahrain, and not other GCC countries, faced such threat. First, the Bahraini 
population is 70 percent composed of the Shia sect ruled and discriminated against 
by an authoritarian Sunni regime. The government does not recognize the demands 
and the needs of the Shia that are continuously being marginalized and suppressed. 
The high unemployment rate among Shia citizens, their political and social 
persecution, and the emergence of the Arab Spring triggered the discriminated 
majority that was also supported by some Sunni citizens to revolt against the 
authoritarian rule. Shia citizens are also present in some other GCC countries like 
Saudi Arabia and Kuwait; they however do not constitute the absolute majority of 
the population. Therefore, their protests can be easily controlled.   
Second, Bahrain has the lowest oil reserve among the GCC countries, and its 
economy is not based on hydrocarbon rents. Instead, it depends on trade, financial 
institutions, and foreign investment. Alike the rentier states, Bahrain’s authoritarian 
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regime cannot insulate itself from sociopolitical challenges. Other Gulf countries 
possess enormous oil and gas reserves which allows them to co-opt wide sectors of 
society. They were financially able to create new employment opportunities, increase 
the salary of the public sector employees, and grant benefits and monetary gifts to 
their citizens. These countries hence financially accommodated their population. 
“Kuwait announced a US$5 billion domestic program that provided $3,500 in cash to 
every citizen along with free foodstuffs for a year; the Saudi monarchy committed 
$130 billion to job creation, salary increases, and development projects; and Qatar 
announced massive pay and benefit hikes for public servants and military personnel” 
(Yom & Gause III, 2012, p. 83). However, Bahrain does not have these means to 
accommodate its citizens. 
Third, other GCC ruling families especially in Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, United 
Arab Emirates, and Oman form a cross-cutting governmental coalition and nurture 
their alliance with other parties to maintain their authoritarian rule (Yom & Gause 
III, 2013, p. 86). By contrast, in Bahrain, the Al-Khalifa ruling family is solely ruling 
the country. It did not form any coalition with the Shia parties; it even banned the 
creation of some. The only Shia present in the government were pro-government 
figures that do represent the majority of the population. In other words and unlike 
other Gulf states, Bahrain’s authoritarian regime does not seem to be durable 
indefinitely.  
 
5.3. A Look to the Future 
For the time being, some GCC countries have been able to financially 
accommodate their citizens and prevent protests demanding regime change. As for 
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Bahrain, the non-accommodated opposition organized the most threatening 
revolution, and was violently crushed.  
Nonetheless, the governments of Saudi, Arabia, Kuwait, Oman, and other 
GCC countries may not always be able to financially accommodate their citizens. 
And the discriminated-against Shia in Bahrain will eventually not fear the violent 
response of the regime. With the improvement of technology and globalization, no 
population will accept anymore to be discriminated, marginalized, and ruled by an 
authoritarian regime. The Arab uprisings are not over yet, they have just started and 
the future is now being shaped. The citizens revolted against their dictators and 
called for freedom, dignity, social justice, human rights, and democracy. These 
protestors will not let injustice, corruption and oppression rule indefinitely. This 
reconstruction process would be championed by the leaders of Al-Wifaq party, it 
however will take a long time. After the collapse of authoritarian regimes, the viable 
and successful power-sharing model that can stabilize political institutions and 
prevent future divisions between the citizens of Bahrain is the one that contains the 
three principles discussed in this thesis: the institutional engineering of liberal 
consociationalism, mutual recognition, and autonomy. 
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